Florida Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 2

Article 2

April 2001

Amadou Diallo and the "Foreigner" Meme: Interpreting the
Applicatoin of Federal Court Interpreter
Leslie V. Dery

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Leslie V. Dery, Amadou Diallo and the "Foreigner" Meme: Interpreting the Applicatoin of Federal Court
Interpreter, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 239 (2001).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Dery: Amadou Diallo and the "Foreigner" Meme: Interpreting the Applicat

AMADOU DIALLO AND THE "FOREIGNER" MEME:
INTERPRETING THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL COURT
INTERPRETER LAWS
Leslie V. Dery"
1.

INTRODUCTION ....................................

240

A. Amadou Dialloand the "Foreigner"Meme ...........
240
B. The "Foreigner"Meme and FederalCourtInterpreter
Access .........................................
247
C. "LinguisticNeed" and "Blameworthiness"........... 250
D. "LinguisticNeed" as a Set of "GeneralRules" Rather
Than as a Standard ..............................
251
II.

1I.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COURT

INTERPRETER LAWS .................................

252

A. The Source of "Primary"JudicialDiscretionand
the Early Provisions ..............................
B. The ConstitutionalProtections .....................
C. The Court InterpretersAct .........................

252
256
258

How THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY APPLIES THE

FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETER LAWS ...................

IV.

266

A. The "Foreigner"Meme and FederalCourt
InterpreterAccess ...............................
B. "LinguisticNeed" and "Blameworthiness". .........
C. "LinguisticNeed" as a Set of "General Rules" Rather
Than as a Standard ..............................

267
278

CONCLUSION ......................................

287

284

* Associate Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law. B.A., University
ofCalifornia, San Diego; M.S. (French-Linguistics), Georgetown University; J.D., Hastings College
of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and advice of Cindy Parkhurst.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Amadou Diallo and the "Foreigner"Meme
This is an Article about a particular meme' and its effect on a certain
aspect of the federal criminal justice system. A meme is anything passed

from person to person generally by imitation or copying.2 It is a behavior,
idea, or attitude adopted from relatives and strangers and then transmitted
to other relatives and strangers until it permeates the dominant culture, if
not the society as a whole.3 In the following pages, I examine the meme of
"foreigner" as reflected in the accessibility of court-appointed interpreters
to non-primarily-English-speaking defendants in federal criminal
proceedings. However, I initially focus on the brief life and shocking death

of Amadou Diallo to illustrate how extensively the "foreigner" meme
governs intercultural interaction in this country.' I then turn to the federal
court interpreter statutes and cases to analyze the extent to which the
5

"foreigner" meme influences the application of these federal laws.

For the dominant culture, "foreigner" pejoratively refers to any non-

native-born American. 6 However, the meme communicates more than
nativism, or the dominant culture's wish to wall-off the United States from
outsiders and to force current immigrants either to assimilate or leave.7
1. Rhymes with "theme." See NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1740 (1993).
2. "An element of culture or system of behavior that may be considered to be passed from
one individual to another by non-genetic means, esp. imitation." Id. See generally SUSAN J.
BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1999); RICHARD BRODIE, VIRUSES OF THE MIND: THE NEW
SCIENCE OF THE MEME (1996); AARON LYNCH, THOUGHT CONTAGION: How BELIEF SPREADS
THROUGH SOCIETY (1996).
3. "Culture" is "synonymous with 'a nation,' or 'a people'--that is, an intergenerational
community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing
a distinct language and history." WiILKYMLKA,MULTICULTURALCrIZENSHP: ALIBERALTHEORY
OFMINORrrY RIGHTS 18 (1995). 1 use "dominant culture" to describe white native-born Americans.
4. Around 1:00 a.m. on Feb. 4, 1999, four white plainclothes police officers killed Amadou
Diallo, a recent Guinean immigrant, while he was standing in the vestibule of his apartment in New
York City. At the time, the officers were reportedly searching for a rape suspect in the area. The
officers fired 41 rounds at Mr. Diallo because he supposedly seemed to fit the generic description
of the rapist and to act suspiciously. Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an
UnarmedMan Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at Al. Mr. Dialo also reportedly appeared to
reach for a weapon, although only a pager and wallet were later found on his body. Id.
5. With the exception of United States ex rel.Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir.
1970), which influenced Congress and the federal judiciary, this Article covers only federal criminal
cases. See discussion infra Parts lH.B., lI.A.
6. "Foreigner" in this Article encompasses all of the vicious and degrading expressions the
dominant culture has historically inflicted upon subordinate or minority cultures in this country.
7. Kenneth L. Karst, Pathsto Belonging: The Constitutionand CulturalIdentity, 64 N.C.
L. REV. 303, 311 (1986). Nativism has been defined as:
[I]ntense opposition to an inteml minority on the grounds of its foreign (i.e. "un-
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"Foreigner" also conveys the dominant culture's belief that the immigrants,
themselves, induce any animosity they suffer by not abandoning their
national or ethnic identity in favor of dominant culture norms.' To the
extent immigrants fail to "pass" as part of the dominant culture, they are
to be vilified as challenging its self-identity and fundamental values.9 The
American") connections. Specific nativistic antagonisms may, and do, vary widely
in response to the changing character of minority irritants and the shifting
conditions of the day; but through each separate hostility runs the connecting,
energizing force of modem nationalism. While drawing on much broader culturalantipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into a zeal to
destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life.
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS INTHE LAND 4 (2d ed. 1988).
8.
The metaphor of "melting" popular from the early nineteenth century up to the
1930's, implied that both the "old stock" and more recent immigrants would
contribute to a new American character and culture. The term, however, often
served as an integrationist cloak for public and private programs aimed at forcing
new Americans and their children to conform to the attitudes and behavior of their
British-American predecessors. This "Anglo conformity" came to dominate the
idea of assimilation and thus to redefine the qualifications for being received in
our Alma Mater's lap.
Karst, supra note 7, at 312. Before the 1960's, the dominant culture expected complete assimilation
or the "Anglo-conformity" model of immigration, even refusing entry to those individuals seen as
"unassimilable" due to race or ethnicity. See KYMIOXA, supra note 3, at 14. At that time,
"[a]ssimilation was seen as essential for political stability and was further rationalized through
ethnocentric denigration of other cultures." Id. Beginning in the 1970s America's immigration
policy changed. Immigrants were encouraged to maintain their national or ethnic identities. Id. at
13, 61-62. This change was due in part to the repeal of the national origins quota act in 1965. Juan
F. Perea, Demography and Distrust:An Essay on American Languages, CulturalPluralism,and
Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 344 (1992). Later, large numbers of undocumented
immigrants from Latin America were legalized during periods of amnesty in 1987 and 1988. Id.
Some immigrants responded by demanding greater political, social, and economic recognition and
participation within society as national orethnic groups. KYMILKA, supranote 3, at 13, 61-62. Their
response led to a dominant culture backlash. "Liberals argued that immigrants had no legitimate
basis to claim such national rights. After all, they had come voluntarily, knowing that integration
was expected of them. When they chose to leave their culture and come to America, they voluntarily
relinquished their national membership, and the national rights which go with it." Id. at 62.
Dominant culture conservatives reacted more harshly. In the 1980s, they generated a renaissance
of the English-only movement, this time targeting the newest influx of Hispanic and Southeast
Asian immigrants. See generallyLaura Cordero, ConstitutionalLimitations on Official English
Declarations,20 N.M. L. REV. 17, 23-25 (1990); Leslie V. Dery, Disinterringthe "Good" and
"Bad Immigrant":ADeconstructionof the State CourtInterpreterLawsforNon-English-Speaking
CriminalDefendants, 45 KAN. L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1997); Karst. supra note 7, at 351; Perea,
supra,at 340-45; MichaelW. Valente, Comment, One Nation Divisible By Language:AnAnalysis
of Official English Laws in the Wake ofYniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 8 SETON HALL.
CONST. L.J. 205, 207-11 (1997).
9. See Karst, supranote 7,at 313-15.
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meme's message is quite clear: to belong in America,"° immigrants must
conform or face stigmatization, exclusion, and even violence from the
dominant culture."
The extent to which immigrants assimilate, if at all, varies according to
their individual needs and experiences. Many immigrants do aspire to
become part of the American "melting pot"' 2 but find it daunting because
of differences in beliefs, customs, language, education, and job skills.
Assimilation is indeed a complicated process culminating with a change
of self-identity, which usually occurs only in succeeding generations.' 3
Other immigrants resist assimilating for various reasons, preferring to
retain their national or ethnic identity while making the United States their
new home. 4 Some want to insulate themselves completely from the
,10. "America" in this Article is synonymous with the United States.
11. See Karst,supra note 7, at 303-25. The dominant culture's behavior has been described
as the projection of an internalized "negative identity," which its individual members constantly
strive to keep in check to satisfy the idealized self-image of their group:
To grow up in a culture is to learn that some ways of acting or talking or thinking
are right and other ways are wrong. The very sense of one's identity is connected
intimately with this learning; a young girl, in order to appreciate the idea of correct
behavior must understand the possibility of behaving incorrectly and recognize
that possibility in herself. Thus, each of us carries around inside the image of...
a "negative identity," which must be repressed if we are to live up to the
expectations of our cultural groups. Outsiders - those who belong to other
groups with other ways of behaving - make us uncomfortable partly because our
own acculturation has not prepared us to understand their behavior and partly
because they serve so handily as screens on which we can project our own
negative identities. Our psychic response is predictable: we want to repress the
outsiders' incorrect foreign ways.
Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
12. The reported origin and definition of the term "melting pot" varies. See Karst, supra note
7, at 312. "The term 'melting pot' is also somewhat misleading. It referred primarily to 'the
biological fusing of various (white) ethnic groups through intermarriage, more than through cultural
practices."' See KYMILKA, supra note 3, at 197.
13. See Karst,supra note 7, at 332.
14. For example, not all "Hispanics" emigrate from their respective countries for the same
reason:
The Cuban refugees living in Miami see themselves as exiles, not immigrants.
When they arrived in the United States, they assumed that their return to Cuba was
imminent. The American government encouraged this assumption, partly for
political reasons during the Cold War. As a result, Cuban exiles have not had the
incentive to integrate, and the larger society has not encouraged them to do so....
Similarly, Mexicans working illegally in the United States are always one step
away from leaving the country. Since they are not able to apply for citizenship,
and face a serious task of being deported at any time, they too have not had the
incentive or encouragement to integrate. Moreover, they lack access to the
language instruction offered immigrants. If we set aside these special cases, and
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dominant culture, anticipating a temporary stay in this country. These last
immigrants intend to remain just long enough to improve their education
or finances or until the civil unrest or repressive government in their
country of origin no longer exists. 5 Like other immigrants, arriving
Africans are diverse in their desire or ability to "become Americanized."
Many come to the United States to escape the internal strife or poverty of
their respective countries.' 6 Some may find themselves in fairly menial
jobs here, working as taxi drivers or street peddlers to earn money to send
to their families, before returning themselves. 7 Whether these immigrants
eventually stay in America for two years or twenty, they proclaim Africa
as their home.'8 For them, the United States is a "utilitarian stop" rather
than a permanent residence.' 9
On the other hand, there are many middle-class, well-educated Africans
who are seeking better educational and employment opportunities in the
United States. 21 Most of these immigrants, like Amadou Diallo, are young
men. At the time of his death, the twenty-two year old Guinean had been
in America for two and one-half years. 2' Apparently, he came to New York
for a college education, possible entrepreneurship, and "adventure."'2 2 To
look instead at Hispanic immigrants who come to the United States with the
intention to stay and become citizens, the evidence suggests that they, as much as
any other immigrants, are committed to learning English and participating in the
mainstream society. Indeed, among Latino immigrants, "assimilation to the
English group occurs more rapidly now than it did one hundred years ago."
KYMILKA, supra note 3, at 16 (citation omitted).
15. Id.
16. Amy Waldman, Ina Questfor Peace and Opportunity, WestAfricans FindAnger,N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at B6.
17. See Amy Waldman, Shooting inthe Bronx: The Immigrants; Killing Heightens the
Unease Felt by Africans inNew York,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at Al.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20.
"The reason most Africans leave to come here is not different from the reasons any
European leaves for-for education, upward mobility, to maintain their family, to
star as an entrepreneur," said Sidique Abubakarr Wai, the president of the United
African Congress, one of the many groups that the African diaspora has created
in the United States.
Id.
21. Amadou Diallo had emigrated from Guinea in West Africa. Amy Waldman, A Hard
Worker With a Gentle Smile, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at B5. Although Guinea is not involved in
civil war, it is an impoverished country "where literacy hovers at 80 percent and avenues for
advancement are few." Amy Waldman, In a QuestforPeaceandOpportunity, West Africans Find
Anger,N.Y. Tim, Feb. 6, 1999, at B6.
22. Ginger Thompson & Garry Pierre-Pierre, Portrait of Slain Immigrant: Big Dreams and
a Big Heart,N.Y. TMIMEs, Feb. 12, 1999, at Al.
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support himself, Mr. Diallo was a street peddler in the Bronx.23 If he had
emigrated from an English-speaking country, he could have qualified to
work for the City of New York.2 1 It is unclear how long Mr. Diallo
intended to stay or whether he hoped to assimilate, but increasingly more
young African men are choosing to remain here, yet opting to live apart
from both the dominant culture and African-Americans.25 "Some Africans
simply fear that mixing with the melting pot that is in New York will mean
subjugating their culture. 26 Others try to acculturate as much as they can
and begin to identify with the concerns of African-Americans. 7
Whether or not Amadou Diallo had planned to settle here and to
integrate, he was an immigrant, and consistent with the "foreigner" meme,
the mainstream media considered him to be somehow blameworthy for his
shooting.28 Significant were published accounts that Mr. Diallo was not
proficient in English
and that his lack of proficiency explained the officers'
' The New
"panic response."29
York Times initially quoted friends and family
as saying that Mr. Diallo's "English was good but he spoke slowly, with
a stutter."30 Thereafter, without explanation, the Times related that he
"spoke halting English."'" Finally, the paper quoted a police union lawyer
who claimed that "Mr. Diallo appeared to have a problem understanding
and responding to the officers' shouted commands."3 2 Although the Times
added that Mr. Diallo's friends had refuted this claim,33 the suggestion to
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See Waldman, supra note 17, at Al.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Published reports were based on information obtained exclusively from police
investigators and the suspect officers' attorneys. There were apparently no civilian eyewitnesses and
the officers involved declined to comment. See, e.g., Holding Fire, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 9,1999, at
A22; Kevin Flynn, Police EstablishLocation of the Officers Involved in Shooting, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1999, at B8; Kevin Flynn, Shooting in the Bronx: The Overview; Revisiting a Killing:
Many Details but a Mystery Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at A37.
29. Patricia Williams, UsualSuspects; New York; New York Police ShootAfrican Man, THE
NATION, Mar. 8,1999, at 10. "Many white citizens believe there had to be some causal trigger for
the burst of gunfire. A 'panic response' is most frequently cited as the 'rational' explanation." Id.
30. Amy Waldman, A Hard Worker With a Gentle Smile, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at B5.
31. Holding Fire,N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 9,1999, at A22.
32. Flynn, supra note 28, at A37; see also Somini Sengupta, FarFrom Home, Alone, N.Y.
TnMES, Mar. 14, 1999, at Al (describing troubles faced by young immigrant children lacking
education and English skills).
33. Flynn, supranote 28, at A37. "Mr. Diallo's friends have disputed the notion that he had
a problem understanding English." Id. On March 26, the Times again relied on the statements of
Stephen Worth, lawyer for the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, in reporting:
It was unclear from the lawyer's account at what point in the confrontation the
officers drew their weapons. They asked Mr. Diallo to do something, the lawyer
said, though he did not say what it was. There may have been a language problem.
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the contrary was strong enough for one legal commentator later to assert:
"[Amadou] Diallo's limited English surely could have been the source of
some awful misunderstanding."34 In other words, his apparent inability to
speak and understand English "as a native-born American would," must
have helped trigger the barrage of police gunfire.
Such reporting by and for the dominant culture left no doubt that as a
"foreigner" Mr. Diallo was at least partially "at fault" for his own death.
No mainstream media accounts asked if Mr. Diallo had been given the
chance to respond to police or if his response was heard or ignored by
officers. Ironically, police insistence that Mr. Diallo "acted suspiciously"
could mean that his conduct matched that. of an innocent person, as
opposed to that of the criminal the officers thought they were encountering.
After all, if Mr. Diallo did seem non-responsive, unpredictable, confused
and afraid, he was behaving as anyone would when suddenly accosted at
1:00 a.m. by four armed strangers, yelling orders and insisting they were
(undercover) police. English language fluency would have altered neither
Mr. Diallo's nor the officers' actions in these circumstances.35
At this point, it would be disingenuous for me to disregard the
institutional racism that motivated the four white officers and resulted in
media outrage. Amadou Diallo was a black man. For New York's AfricanFriends of Mr. Diallo said he spoke English, but slowly and with a stutter. In any
case, Mr. Diallo did not comply, the lawyer said.
Robert D. McFadden, FourOfficers IndictedforMurder in Killing of Diallo,Lawyer Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999, at Al.
34. Williams, supra note 29, at 10.
35. But see Richard W. Cole & Laura Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel andthe Courts
in Addressing Foreign Language and Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal
Proceeding, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 193, 195-96 (1997).
Some defendants, victims, or witnesses from different cultures may be
misunderstood, or their actions, appearance, or demeanor misinterpreted bypolice,
parties, jurors, or the court itself. This is because social and behavioral norms of
persons from a foreign country may appear suspect because they are not within the
common experience of native-born Americans. Excessive and exaggerated hand
gestures, for example, may be incorrectly interpreted as a sign of threatening
behavior or emotional instability rather than behavior learned as a child in a
foreign culture to accentuate a point. Prejudicial misimpressions may result
because a defendant fails to make eye contact with the police or jury, speaks in a
voice unnaturally loud or soft, or appears without emotion. These and other forms
of non-verbal communication may be misinterpreted because of cultural
differences. An understanding of cultural norms may be relevant and necessary to
the accurate evaluation of a defendant's demeanor and behavior in interactions
with the police, in assessing witness credibility, as well as in determining the level
of culpability and contrition of a defendant for sentencing purposes.
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Americans and Hispanics, his killing was "the latest tragic manifestation
of the ruthless and humiliating treatment of ethnic minorities that is part of
the daily routine of so many cops in this city." 36 New York Times editorials
endorsed the widespread feeling among ethnic minorities that, unlike the
dominant culture, they "live in a police state., 37 The paper maintained that
racial profiling and police brutality strip minority populations of their
constitutional rights 38 and that such misconduct is tolerated, if not
condoned, by the dominant culture. 9 In other words, when the mainstream
36. Bob Herbert, In America; A Brewing Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A33.
37. David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15,1999, at Al; see also Frank Bruni, Ideasand Trends: Crimes ofthe War on Crime;
BehindPoliceBrutality:PublicAssent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at D1; Jodi Wilgoren & Ginger
Thompson, After Shooting, an Eroding Trust in the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at Al.
In the aftermath of the shooting death of Amadou Diallo, fewer than a quarter of
all New Yorkers believe that the police treat blacks and whites evenly, with blacks
in particular viewing the police with fear and distrust, according to a New York
Times poll. Nearly 9 out of 10 black residents said they thought the police often
engaged in brutality against blacks, and almost two-thirds said police brutality
against members of minority groups is widespread.
Dan Barry & Marjorie Connelly, Poll in New York Finds Many Think Police Are Biased, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al.
38. Racial profiling is "the practice of targeting citizens for police encounters on the basis of
race." David Cole, The ColorofJustice: CourtsAreProtecting,Ratherthan Helpingto End,Racial
Profilingby Police, THE NATION, Oct. 11, 1999, at 12. Both racial profiling and police brutality
violate an individual's Fourth (search and seizure), Fifth (due process), and Fourteenth (due
process, equal protection) Amendment rights. Indeed, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found
on June 16, 2000 "that the New York Police Department widely uses improper racial profiling to
stop and question blacks and Latinos, contributing to turbulent racial tensions that can escalate into
'tragic and unnecessary' events like the police shooting of unarmed Amadou Diallo." U.S. Rights
Panelsays NYPD Uses Racial Profiling,L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2000, at Al.
39. "I don't believe that most white New Yorkers condone police misconduct, but there have
not been nearly enough white voices raised against the atrocities committed by the police. This
unfortunate silence is, indeed, a form of encouragement." Herbert, supra note 36, at A33.
As James Alan Fox, Dean of the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern
University, notes, these officers have been told that they form the front line in a
"war" on crime and a "war" on drugs, that they have been enlisted in special
"operations" and drafted for bold new "offensives." "We use all of these
paramilitary terms," Mr. Fox said, "and we have promoted somewhat of a siege
mentality among police: The enemy is out there, and there are more of them than
we thought." Mr. Fox paused, sighed and added, "When you have this sort of
mentality, excessive brutality and improper actions are more likely to occur." Mr.
Fox's comments root out what is indisputably a dirty little secret embedded in the
public angst over police brutality: many Americans have come not only to tolerate
a degree of it from their police officers but also, in ways subtle and unsubtle, to
encourage it.
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media saw Amadou Diallo solely as a black man (rather than as a Guinean
immigrant) he became a victim. The "foreigner" meme did not apply.
Accordingly, Mr. Diallo was not responsible for his own death. So, despite
its extensive coverage on racial profiling, exposing the discriminatory
practice in several states, the mainstream media adheres to the meme in
covering an immigrant40 This dichotomous view of what can be the same
person generates a kind of schizophrenic public image: Amadou Diallo
was both guilty and innocent in provoking law enforcement. Unfortunately,
the lingering imprint of his image is probably one of guilt; the officers'
racial profiling led to their initial approach, but the "foreigner's" language
problems caused his own death. In other words, the dominant culture
media generated the impression that law enforcement infringed Mr.
Diallo's constitutional rights in confronting him, but shooting him was
legally excusable under the circumstances. 4 '
B. The "Foreigner"Meme and FederalCourt InterpreterAccess
Another irony is that although Mr. Diallo's English knowledge was
supposedly "bad" enough to imperil his life at the hands of police, it may
have been "too good" to imperil his right to counsel and due process in the
courtroom to give him access to interpreter services. 42 If Amadou Diallo
had not been killed, but instead had been arrested and then tried for
committing a federal crime, he would not have been automatically entitled
to an interpreter, even on demand.43 The availability of court interpreters
in federal criminal proceedings is at the discretion of the trial judge, who
controls every aspect of their appointment and use.4 Federal statutes and
Bruni, supra note 37, at DI.
40. See Cole, supra note 38, at 12. "he press has covered the subject [of racial profiling]
widely, recounting tales ofblack professionals stopped for petty traffic violations and investigating
the arrest patterns of offending cops." Id.
41. Tried instate court on charges ranging from second-degree murder to criminally negligent
homicide and reckless endangerment of bystanders, the four officers were acquitted on February
25, 2000. Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict. The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are
Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TOMS, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al. After the verdict, the N.Y. Times

reported that
[d]uring the trial, the officers acknowledged their mistake in shooting Mr. Diallo.
The defense lawyers made the officers' testimony the centerpiece oftheir defense,
asserting that the shooting was justified because they had believed Mr. Diallo was
grabbing a gun.... Their lawyers laid much of the blame for the shooting on Mr.
Diallo himself, saying that he had behaved suspiciously and had not obeyed the

officers' commands to stop.
Id.
42. See discussion infra Part III.
43. See discussion infra Part III.
44. See discussion infra Part III.
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case law serve only to guide the judge on the appropriate exercise of
discretion. 45 The controlling "standard"" is the defendant's linguistic need
for interpreter services as perceived by the judge.47 While there is no
absolute constitutional right to an interpreter, if the judge decides that a
language barrier will prevent a defendant from comprehending the
proceedings or communicating with counsel, or a witness from being
questioned or understood, the judge must furnish an interpreter.48 In other
words, the federal district court shall supply interpreter services only after
finding that the defendant's level of English competency implicates the
defendant's rights of fundamental due process, adverse witness
confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel embodied in the
Constitution.49 Whether or not the defendant wants an interpreter is not
dispositive; the judge is to assess the defendant's linguistic need, apart
from any request for an interpreter. A request merely serves to put the
judge on notice that the defendant's linguistic need should be ascertained."
Consequently, the defendant can neither require nor reject interpreter
services in federal district court."'
The district court's exercise of discretion is easy when the defendant is
a newly arrived immigrant with no English skills whatsoever.5 " Such a
defendant obviously satisfies the linguistic need standard for interpreter
5 3
services, which then translates into a constitutional right to such services.
However, the existence of the immigrant's linguistic need and the
correlative constitutional right is more problematic when the immigrant
exhibits some English competency but nevertheless has difficulty speaking
and understanding the language. 4 What compounds this dilemma is the
immigrant's failure to ask for interpreter services. To what extent, if at
all,
is the judge nevertheless obligated to consider and then delve into this
immigrant's potential linguistic need in spite of such silence?"
Additionally, competing needs for interpreter services during trial can
impact the district court's decision. The discretion to appoint an interpreter
includes determining how that individual will perform during trial, either
45. See discussion infra Part M.
46. A standard is a "principle or policy," examples of which are "good faith, due care,
fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reasonableness." Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance In PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1688 (1976).
47. See discussion infra Parts II., III.
48. See discussion infra Parts II., III.
49. See discussion infra Parts II., III.
50. See discussion infra Parts II., 1Il.
51. See United States v. Petrosian, 126 F.3d 1232, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1997).
52. See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973).
53. See, e.g., United States exreL Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386,388-89 (2d Cir. 1970).
54. "The status of the right becomes less certain, however, where... the defendant has some
ability to understand and communicate, but clearly has difficulty." Carrion,488 F.2d at 14.
55. See discussion infra Part III.
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as a party, proceedings, or witness interpreter. Traditionally, the judge's
discretion regarding interpreter function has been tied to a kind of assumed
hierarchy of need. To assist the court, a witness interpreter is invariably
furnished to translate into English the witness' (or the defendant's) primary
language testimony for the judge, jury, and attorney.5 6 Generally, judges
have been more willing to provide witness interpreters to ensure the steady
progress of the trial." On the other hand, the main beneficiary of a party or
proceedings interpreter is the defendant. The court appoints a party
interpreter to facilitate counsel-client communications and a proceedings
interpreter to translate the communications among the lawyers, witnesses,
and the judge for the defendant.5 8 However, the absence of a party or
proceedings interpreter is not considered an impediment to the normal trial
process.5 9 Therefore, unless the defendant establishes the requisite
linguistic need, the judge is not predisposed to providing a party or
proceedings interpreter during trial. 6'
Judges also face time and expense disincentives to employing
interpreter services. 6 ' First, locating a qualified interpreter may generate
delays and increase costs. 62 Second, the attorneys' reliance on an interpreter
while questioning witnesses disrupts the natural flow of the testimony,
thereby hindering its spontaneity and increasing its length. 3 Third, the
judge must be prepared for potential errors in translation and resulting
challenges to the interpreter's competency that further impede the progress
of trial.M Legal commentators have discussed all of these constraints on
interpreter access for immigrants who are semi-fluent in English.65 My
56. See Dery, supra note 8, at 842; Charles N. Grabau & Llewellyn J. Gibbons, Protecting
the Rights of LinguisticMinorities:Challengesto CourtInterpretation,30 NEwENG. L. REV. 227,
244-46 (1996); The Right to an Interpreter,25 RUTGERs L. REv. 145, 145-46 (1971); Williamson
B.C. Chang & Manuel U. Araujo, Comment, InterpretersfortheDefense: DueProcessfortheNonEnglishSpeaking Defendant, 63 CAL. L. REV. 801, 802 (1975).
57. See Dery, supra note 8, at 842.
58. Id.

59. See id. at 853.
60. See id. at 842. It is easy to envision judges choosing to provide only witness interpreters
to defendants who "ought to" understand English, and thus have no "real need" for a party or
proceedings interpreter, but whose foreign accents render them "incapable of being understood"
by the dominant culture. While the trial proceeds routinely from the standpoint of the judge, jury,
and attorneys, the defendant is at a loss to understand the process and the outcome. See discussion
infra Part III.B.
61. See Dery, supra note 8, at 853; Michael Schulman, Note, No Hablo Ingles: Court
Interpretationas a Major Obstacle to Fairnessfor Non-English Speaking Defendants,46 VAND.
L. REV. 175, 182 (1993); Chang & Araujo, supra note 56, at 802; see also Grabau & Gibbons,
supra note 56, at 244-46; The Right to an Interpreter,supranote 56, at 145-46.
62. The Right to an Interpreter,supranote 56, at 145-46.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See discussion infra Part ll.C.
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Article pursues a different impediment to interpreter availability in federal
district court. I argue that the "foreigner" meme has reshaped the evaluation
of linguistic need in two respects: (1) As with Amadou Diallo, the
dominant culture attributes "fault" for the "need," this time by its judiciary
rather than by its police or media. (2) Linguistic need is no longer a
standard of judicial discretion, it has been supplanted by several de facto
general rules. I summarize both of these arguments below, before delving
into the development of the federal court interpreter laws and the evolution
of their changing application in federal district court, which I discuss at
length.
C. "LinguisticNeed" and "Blameworthiness"
The judiciary's imposition of blame in regulating interpreter access
occurs at both the district and circuit court levels. It arises as a kind of
cycling and recycling of the "foreigner" meme through the federal justice
system. The cycle begins with the defendant's post-conviction appeal,
attacking the trial judge's failure to provide an interpreter as either a
constitutional or statutory violation or both.' The appellate court reviews
the record and blames the defendant for neither seeking an interpreter nor
satisfying the linguistic need standard to warrant an interpreter
appointment. 7 The appellate court also observes that the defendant should
have known enough English based on education, employment, and time
spent in the United States. It then surmises that this defendant's partial
68
proficiency was indeed sufficient to dispense with interpreter assistance.
The defendant's conviction is thus affirmed.6 9 In light of such precedent,
future trial judges are excused from considering the linguistic need of
similarly situated defendants who do not request interpreter services.7
Without such prompting from the defendant, district courts are rarely
expected to investigate sua sponte the defendant's linguistic need.7 In
subsequent trials other defendants fail to seek interpreter services and trial
judges refrain from providing them. The lack of these services becomes an
issue in the post conviction appeals, and the cycle is repeated.72
What this cycle reveals are two subtle changes to the "foreigner" meme
when it is operating in the context of court regulated access to interpreter
services. First, while language skills are still the source of the immigrant's
blameworthiness, here, fault is derived not from the immigrant's
"unmistakable" lack of English proficiency when interacting with the
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part IlI.B.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part HLI.B.
See discussioninfra Part llI.B.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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dominant culture, but instead from the immigrant's inadequate
demonstration of that lack of proficiency when participating in its justice
system. Second, the circuit court opinions imply that the immigrant
defendant could not show English incompetence because the defendant was
sufficiently proficient in the language. In other words, underlying this
"foreigner's" blameworthiness in the courtroom is a supposedly sinister
motive, the desire to "cheat" the justice system.73
D. "LinguisticNeed" as a Set of "General Rules" Rather
Than as a Standard
The prevalence of the foreigner meme has also changed the composition
of linguistic need as a standard of judicial discretion governing interpreter
access. In judicial decisionmaking, standards are valued for their absence
of "formal realizability" or "ruleness." 74 In applying a standard, the trial
judge is obligated to both discover "the facts of a particular situation and
to assess them in terms of the purposes or social values embodied in the
' What is important to the decisionmaking process
standard."75
is how
unique circumstances can be accommodated within the boundaries of
recognized norms. Standards promote flexibility in decisionmaking,
whereas rules are unyielding and directive. The application of rules is
formulaic, requiring judges "to respond to the presence together of each of
a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening
in a determinate way." 76 Rules are helpful in preventing "official
arbitrariness" and in ensuring "certainty." 77 Both standards and rules have
their strengths and weaknesses in the decisionmaking process. Subverted
by the "foreigner" meme, the linguistic need standard has become
fragmented into several "general rules" or standard/rule hybrids that govern
interpreter appointments." These general rules undermine the fundamental
worth of the discretionary process in that they dissuade trial judges from
seeking justice in the individual case.
My Article proceeds as follows: Part II addresses the origins and
development of federal court interpreter laws. Part ill traces the federal
judiciary's reliance on those statutes and constitutional provisions through
case law, illustrating how the "foreigner" meme is determinative of an
immigrant defendant's linguistic need. Part IV is the conclusion, which
73. See discussion infraPart ITI.B. Such attribution of ill will to immigrants reinforces "the

assumed connection between alienage and disloyalty, (that) appears to be deeply rooted in the role
that 'negative identity' plays in [the dominant culture's] self-definition." Karst, supra note 7, at
318.
74. Kennedy, supra note 46, at 1687.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1687-88.
77. Id. at 1688.
78. See id. at 1687-88.
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details why reliance onjudicial discretion for interpreter access is no longer
tenable and should be replaced by interpreter appointments on demand.
Now I turn to a final point to forestall possible confusion. Federal court
jurisprudence encompasses two distinct formulations ofjudicial discretion,
both of which I discuss in my Article.79 One meaning is "primary
discretion," or the power of the trial judge to ascertain the facts and then to
arbitrate and apply the law to those facts in rendering a decision."0 In
exercising such discretion, the judge is "free from the constraints which
characteristically attach whenever legal rules enter the decision process."'
I track the district court's discretion to decide whether or not a particular
immigrant merits an interpreter within the meaning of relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions. Primary discretion here turns on the
interaction between the judge and the defendant. Another meaning is
"secondary discretion," which entails the respective roles of the district and
circuit courts. Of concern is the allocation of power between them,
specifically, the right of the trial judge "to be wrong without incurring
reversal."8' For the appellate court, secondary discretion signifies the selflimitation that is established when the trial judge's decision is given "a
status or authority that makes it either unchallengeable, or challengeable to
' I explore the extent to which district
only a restricted degree."83
court
decisions on interpreter access are accorded deference by the courts of
appeal."
If. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL
COURT INTERPRETER LAWS

A. The Source of "Primary"JudicialDiscretion
and the Early Provisions
The trial judge's discretion to regulate interpreter access was originally
derived from the federal judiciary's longstanding power to regulate its
proceedings. Since the 1800's, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that Article III of the United States Constitution 5
implicitly grants district courts "inherent" authority1 6 ,"tomanage their own
79. Henry J.Friendly, IndiscretionAbout Discretion,31 EMORY L.J, 747,754-55 (1982).
80. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637-41 (1977); see also discussion infra Parts II., II.
81. Rosenberg, supra note 80, at 637.
82. Id. Justice Friendly described secondary discretion as "how far an appellate court is
bound to sustain rulings of the trial judge which it disapproves but does not consider to be outside
the ball park." Friendly, supra note 79, at 754.
83. Rosenberg, supra note 80, at 641.
84. See discussion infra Part I.
85. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
86. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1856). The district courts' inherent
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affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."'
In other words, trial judges can "adopt and enforce their own selfpreserving rules" when appropriate." Congress has been of the same mind.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 and its progeny allow federal-courts to formulate
"all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business."89 The Court
and Congress codified this inherent authority with respect to interpreter
access in several rules and statutes. 9° These early provisions guide district
courts on the appointment, 9' compensation, 92 and expert qualifications9 3 of
interpreters. Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure empowers
trial judges to supply interpreter services at their discretion for any
reasonable purpose. 94 A proper exercise of such discretion includes
authority is either distinct from or a subset of their supervisory power. See Sara Beale,
Reconsidering Supervisory Powerin Criminal Cases: ConstitutionalandStatutory Limits on the

Authority of the FederalCourts, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 1433, 1455-57 (1984). However, the concepts
are not interchangeable. See United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168,174-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
87. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,43 (1991) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S.
626,630-31 (1962)); see also United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,33-34 (1812). For
an exceptional analysis of the federal courts' inherent power and its (improperly) extended
supervisory power, see Beale, supranote 86, at 1433.
88. MacDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915).
89. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 83
(1789). In modem times the statute has been succeeded by 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and Rule 57(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Federal statute 28 U.S.C. §2071 (2000) states: "The Supreme
Court and all courts established by Acts of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the
conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice
and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title." Rule 57(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (1944) provides:
A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these
rules and local rules of the district. No sanction or other disadvantage may be
imposed for noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules
or the local district rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the
particular case with actual notice of the requirement.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) (1944). The Advisory Committee note states: "One of the purposes of this
rule is to abrogate any existing requirement of conformity to State procedure on any point
whatsoever." FED. R. CalM. P. 57 advisory committee's note.
90. FED. R. CRIM. P. 28 (1975); Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat.
552 (1964) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1994); FED. R. EVID. 604).
91. FED.R.CRIM.P.28.
92. Id.; see also The Criminal Justice Act of 1964.
93. FED. R. EviD. 604.
94. See FED. R. CRIM P. 28. In 1933, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe
rules as to criminal proceedings after the verdict. Act of Feb. 24, 1933, ch. 119, 47 Stat. 904
(amended 1934). The Supreme Court promptly issued rules in 1934. See R. CRIM.P. (1934). Finally
in 1940, Congress enlarged the power of the Court to include procedure prior to and including the
verdict. Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (1940). The Court exercised its power and the
new rules became effective in 1946. Among them, Rule 28 extended the common law practice of
district courts calling and examining their own witnesses to include expert witnesses. See original

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVLEW

[Vol. 5

deciding when an interpreter is to be furnished and what role that
interpreter will play as a witness, party, or proceedings interpreter.' The
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 mandates that interpreters be compensated by
'9 6
the federal government if they are necessary for "an adequate defense.
Rule 604 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective in 1975, 97 directs that
interpreters be bound by the same evidentiary requirements covering expert
witness qualifications and testimony.98
All of these interpreter-related provisions remain in effect today.
Because their intended purpose was to benefit the judge, jury, and
attorneys, they were used initially for the appointment of witnessinterpreters. Interpreter access was mainly a matter of convenience to the
district court rather than of constitutional protection for the defendant. 99
Advisory Committee Note of 1946 to Rule 28: "The rule provides a procedure, whereby the court
may, if it chooses, exercise this power in connection with expert witnesses." FED R. Cirv. P. 28
advisory committee's note. In the 1966 amendment to Rule 28, the procedure was expanded to
include the appointment and compensation of interpreters. The expert witness portion of the Rule
became a separate subdivision. See FED R. CIV. P. 28 advisory committees's note of 1996 to
Amendment to Rule 28. Rule 28(a) expert witnesses, and (b) interpreter services. Then in 1975, the
expert witness subdivision was stricken, but the text concerning interpreter services was retained.
As a result, FED. R. Civ. P. 28 currently provides: "The court may appoint an interpreter of its own
selection and may fix the reasonable compensation ofsuch an interpreter. Such compensation shall
be paid out of the funds provided by law or by the government, as the court may direct." "General
language is used to give discretion to the court to appoint interpreters in all appropriate situations."
FED R. CrV. P. 28 advisory committee's note of 1996.
95. FED R. Civ. P. 28 advisory committee's note of 1966. "Interpreters may be needed to
assist non-English speaking defendants in understanding the proceedings orin communicating with
assigned counsel. Interpreters may also be needed where a witness or a defendant is deaf." Ide; see
also United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule 28
governs appointment of interpreter for deaf juror).
96. Court-appointed counsel may obtain expert or "other" services "necessary to an adequate
defense." Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C.§ 3006A(e).
97. The original Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975.
98. Specifically, Rule 604 directs that an interpreter be subject to the rules "relating to
qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation that he will make a true
translation." FED. R. EVID. 604. Rule 604 should be read in conjunction with FED. R. CIrv. P. 28 and
FEDR. EviD. 603. FED. R. EviD. 603 provides: "Before testifying, every witness shall be required
to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to
awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so. Effective January 1975."
99. See Marilyn R. Frankenthaler, Spanish Translationin the Courtroom,7 SOC. AcrION&
L. 51, 52 (1980) (citing United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 891-92 (2d Cir. 1967)).
Since a witness interpreter is appointed so that witnesses can communicate with
the court in a manner which as closely as possible approximates the
communication of English-speaking witnesses, one might assume that this type
of logic is also carried over to the appointment of party interpreters, i.e., so that
the non-English speaking defendant can understand all testimony and
communicate with his attorney in a manner which as closely as possible puts him
in the same position as an English-speaking defendant. However, if we bear in
mind that the benefit of the party interpreter is primarily personal to the party,
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Accordingly, these provisions contain no accompanying penalties or other
enforcement mechanisms to encourage compliance. In exercising
secondary discretion, appellate courts allotted trial judges broad primary
discretion in mediating witness-interpreter access within the meaning of
these provisions.'0 Thus, there was little chance of a successful challenge
on appeal.' 0 ' Moreover, a defendant's failure at trial to object to the lack of
witness interpreter services operated as a waiver by silence of those
services on appeal.1 2 On the other hand, if a defendant did demand and
while the benefit of the witness interpreter is primarily for the court as a whole, we
may find it more comprehensible to deal with the "double standard," whereby the
same party may have better interpreter services as a witness than when exercising
his right of confrontation as a party.
Id.
100. Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86 (1907), is the first case on interpreter access and
the only Supreme Court opinion. In Perovich, defendant was convicted of homicide in the district
court ofthe territory of Alaska. Id. at 89. The trial judge had sustained the prosecution's objection
to the appointment of a witness interpreter for defendant's testimony. Id at 91. On appeal,
defendant contended the judge's denial of interpreter services was improper. Id.The Supreme Court
summarily dispensed with defendant's claim of error, declaring interpreter access is at the district
court's discretion. Id. Moreover, whether or not the appointment of an interpreter is necessary is
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 88, 91; see also United States v. Martinez, 616
F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (lst Cir. 1973); United
States v. Barrios, 457 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1972); Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709, 712
(5th Cir. 1962). See generallyDonna F. Coltharp, Comment, Speaking the LanguageofExclusion:
How EqualProtectionandFundamentalRightsAnalyses PermitLanguageDiscrimination,28 ST.
MARYS L.J. 149, 183-85 (1996).
101. Judge Friendly observed that the level of appellate scrutiny is linked to the nature of the
trial judge's decision. Friendly, supra note 79, at 764.
The justifications for committing decisions to the discretion of the trial court are
not uniform, and may vary with the specific type of decisions. Although the
standard of review in such instances is generally framed as "abuse of discretion,"
in fact the scope of review will be directly related to the reason why that category
or type of decision is committed to the trial court's discretion in the first instance.
Id. Because interpreter appointments were initially made for the benefit of the district court (as
opposed to the defendant), it is reasonable that its discretion would be typically affirmed on appeal.
Moreover, interpreter access is generally (1) a pre-trial matter, (2) dependent upon the judge's
"observation of the witnesses" and "opportunity to get 'the feel of the case,"' and (3) an aid to the
judge and thus not affecting substantial rights of the defendant. Id. at 761 (quoting Noonan v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d 69,71 (2d Cir. 1967)). These factors traditionally encourage appellate
court deference.
102. See Perovich, 205 U.S. at 88.
As no objection was taken to the ruling of the court sustaining the objection of the
district attorney to the appointment of an interpreter, and as it will be seen, by
reference to the defendant's testimony that an interpreter was unnecessary, there
was no error. The defendant evidently understood the questions that were asked
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was then refused interpreter services, the defendant had no immediate right
of review. The defendant's only possible remedy was an appeal from the
final judgment.
B. The ConstitutionalProtections
There is no per se constitutional right to an interpreter. Yet, if English
incompetence precludes a defendant from comprehending the proceedings
or communicating with counsel, or a witness from being questioned or
understood, the defendant's constitutional rights to fundamental due
process, adverse witness confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel
are jeopardized.10 3 For these rights to be ensured, a party or proceedings
interpreter or both must be supplied. 104
Due process requires that a criminal defendant be "present" at trial,
which implies more than just being physically inside the courtroom.t°5 It
presupposes the defendant will be familiar with and defend against the
charges, participate in the proceedings, and testify if necessary. 6 Unlike
the English-fluent defendant, the non-English-fluent defendant cannot
enjoy due process rights without the assistance of a proceedings
interpreter. " In UnitedStates ex rel. Negron v. New York, the circuit court
held that due process entitles an (indigent) defendant, who cannot speak or
understand English, to the services of a proceedings interpreter even
without a timely request.' Defendant Negron was tried and convicted of
murder by a New York state jury."° Neither he nor his counsel asked the
him and answered them intelligently. Moreover, whether or not the appointment

of an interpreter is necessary is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Id. (citations omitted); accordMartinez,616 F.2d at 188; Carrion,488 F.2d 12 at 15; Barrios,457
F.2d at 682; Suarez, 309 F.2d at 712.
103. United States ex rel. United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1140 (11th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Gallegos-Torres, 841 F.2d 240,242 (8th Cir. 1988); Luna v. Black, 772 F.2d 448,
451 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1985); Jackson v.
Garcia, 665 F.2d 395,396 (lst Cir. 1981); Carrion,488 F.2d at 14; Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d
386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970).
104. See cases cited supra note 103.
105. United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
106. Id. (citing Negron, 434 F.2d at 389); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54-55 (1970);
Smith v. O'Grandy, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941).
107. See, e.g., Carrion,488 F.2d at 14; Negron, 434 F.2d at 389.
108. Negron, 434 F.2d at 390.

109. Id. at 387-88. The New York state jury found Negron guilty of murder in the second
degree and sentenced him to a term of 20 years to life. Id. The appellate division affirmed the
conviction with opinion. People v. Negron, 29 A.D. 2d 1050, 1050 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968). Leave
to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York,
310 F. Supp. 1304, 1305 (E.D. N.Y. 1970). Negron then filed a pro se application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Eastern District of New York, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights.
Negron, 310 F. Supp. at 1305. The federal district judge granted Negron his release, and the State
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judge to appoint an interpreter. Both the prosecutor and the defense counsel
acknowledged that Negron could not understand or speak English.1 0 He
occasionally received summaries of some prosecution witnesses from a
witness interpreter during trial.'' In determining that Negron had been
denied his Fourteenth Amendment rights,"' the court reasoned that
"[c]onsiderations of fairness, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and
the potency of our adversary system of justice forbid that the
state should
' '3
prosecute a defendant who is not present at his own trial.""
The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to confront the prosecution's
adverse witnesses by cross-examination." ' Denial of this right has been
found when defendants with English language difficulties have been
refused proceedings or party interpreter services at trial." 5 Without such
assistance, the trial is nothing but "a babble of voices."" 6 Moreover, where
the attorney is not proficient in the defendant's primary language, any
meaningful and spontaneous consultation between counsel and client is
impossible. This communication gap deprives the defendant of
(linguistically) effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, which has been held to be grounds for appeal." 7
of New York filed an appeal in the Second Circuit. Negron, 310 F. Supp. at 1309; Negron, 434
F.2d at 388.
110. "The government does not dispute that at the time of trial, Negron ...neither spoke nor
understood any English." Negron, 434 F.2d at 388. And, at a hearing before the federal district
court, Negron's lawyer testified that he "was not able to speak with" his client "at all" without an
interpreter. Id. at 391 n.2.
11. See id. at 388. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment governs federal court
criminal proceedings. It provides in pertinent part: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ..." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
113. Negron, 434 F.2d at 388.
114. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all crminal prosecution, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him... and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
115. See Negron, 434 F.2d at 389; United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 172-73
(E.D.N.Y. 1993); Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707 F. Supp. 504,506-07 (M.D. Fla. 1989); United
States ex reL Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
116. Negron, 434 F. 2d at 388.
However astute [the witness interpreter's] summaries may have been, they could
not do service as a means by which Negron could understand the precise nature
of the testimony against him during that period of the trial's progress when the
state chose to bring it forth. Negron's incapacity to respond to specific testimony
would inevitably hamper the capacity of his counsel to conduct effective crossexamination.
Id. at 389-90.
117. Id. at 389.
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C. The CourtInterpretersAct
The Court Interpreters Act (CIA or section 1827) was signed into law
on October 28, 1978, after a five-year legislative process." 8 It became
effective January 26, 1979."' The new legislation was a direct response to
Negron,1 20 which had been critical of the callous treatment suffered by nonEnglish-speaking defendants.' 2' Section 1827 encompassed two purposes:
First, Congress envisioned the CIA as affording language minorities
consistent access to federal court interpreters when "appropriate."" The
And it is equally imperative that every criminal defendant - if the right to be
present is to have meaning-possess "sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Otherwise, "the adjudication
loses its character as a reasoned interaction ...and becomes an invective against
an insensible object."
Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1962) and Incapacity to Stand Trial, 81
HARV. L. REV. 454, 458 (1969)). On the other hand, the trend among Courts of Appeal has been
to dismiss the "ineffective assistance of counser' argument if it is the exclusive ground of appeal
and the court does not recognize the defendant's right to an interpreter. See, e.g., United States v.
Acevedo-Toscano, No. 99-50064,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2589, at *2-*3 (9th Cir. Feb. 9,2000);
United States v. Cheng, No. 99-30073, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4243, at *2-*3 (9th Cir. Mar. 16,
2000); United States v. Mendoza, No. 95-1269, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12455, at *6 (6th Cir. Apr.
17, 1996); Gonzales v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Maniego, 710 F.2d 24,26 (2nd Cir. 1983); Cervantes v. Cox, 350 F.2d 855, 855 (10th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Sanchez, C.A. No. 94-2866, Crim. No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16725,
at *3-*4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1994).
118. Court Interpreters Act of 1978,28 U.S.C. § 1827.
119. Id.
120.
An original impetus for legislation addressing the issue of court interpreters was
the 1970 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District in U.S. ex
rel. Negron v. New York. .. which held that the sixth amendment to the
Constitution requires that non-English speaking defendants be informed of their
right to simultaneous interpretation of proceedings at government expense.
Court Interpreters Act, H.R. REP. No. 95-1687, at 3 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652,
4653.
121. "Particularly inappropriate in this nation where many languages are spoken is a
callousness to the crippling language handicap of a newcomer to its shores, whose life and freedom
the state by its criminal processes chooses to put in jeopardy." Negron, 434 F.2d at 390.
122.
The purpose of the bill is to amend title 28, United States Code, by adding a new
section 1827 to Chapter 119, which new section would specify the circumstances
when an interpreter must be furnished to translate all or part of the court
proceedings for the benefit of a non-English-speaking party or when a witness
does not speak English.... The purpose of S. 1724, as amended, is to provide a
congressional declaration of the situations which are appropriate for language
interpretation.
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legislative history recounts that it was not uncommon in federal criminal
cases for judges to neglect to appoint interpreters even though the
defendants' level of English did not safeguard their constitutional rights
during trial. 23 As a remedy, section 1827 mandates the appointment of an
interpreter
if the presiding judicial officer determines on such officer's
own motion or on the motion of a party that such party
(including a defendant in a criminal case) or a witness who
may present testimony in such judicial proceedings-(A)
speaks only or primarily a language other than the English
language.., so as to inhibit such party's comprehension of
the proceedings or communication with counsel or the
presiding judicial officer, or so as to inhibit such witness'
comprehension
of questions and the presentation of such
24
testimony.1

By specifying the conditions under which judges have no choice but to
provide party and witness interpreter services, Congress undoubtedly
anticipated normalizing rather than liberalizing the current exercise of
judicial discretion among district courts. ' Congress did not intend to give
defendants greater access to interpreter services than is allowed by the
Constitution. 2 6 By designating the district court as the arbiter of the
Senator JohnTunney, BIuNGUALCOURT ACr PROCEEDINGS, S. REP. No. 93-1185, at 1,4-5 (1974)
(precursor to the CIA). In emphasizing the defendant's and witnesses' linguistic need (rather than
the trial judges'), the CIA has largely supplanted the earlier provisions in regulating interpreter
access. See discussion infraPart III.
123.
Despite the discretionary powers which these statute have conferred on federal
judges, testimony before the Subcommittee indicated that several federal
convictions have been reversed on due process grounds where an interpreter had
not been appointed and where the defendant's knowledge of English was either
minimal or nonexistant. In addition, by testimony and by affidavits submitted to
the Subcommittee, we were given examples of recent cases where federal judges
were reluctant to use the discretionary powers which they have been granted.
H.R. REP. No. 95-1687, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4654 (citations
omitted).
124. Court Interpreters Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (2000).
125. Notably, the CIA did not increase interpreter access by making it available on demand.
Interpreter services were still to be supplied at the district courts' discretion or when "the presiding
judicial officer determines" the statutory prerequisites have been met. Id.
126.
The Court Interpreters Act, while underscoring the importance of ensuring the
highest quality translations for non-English speaking defendants, does not create
new constitutional rights for defendants or expand existing constitutional
safeguards rather, the purpose of the Act is to mandate the appointment of
interpreters under certain conditions and to establish statutory guidance for the
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defendant's English proficiency, Congress meant thatjudges retained their
discretion to decide whether interpreter services are warranted in a
particular case.
The legislative history indicates that the second aim of the CIA was to
appease language minorities who had experienced dominant culture
nativism:
Various congressional committees also have found that in the
areas of education, employment, and the administration of
justice, national origin minorities have been discriminated
against not only because of their color, but also because of
their cultural and linguistic differences. It is not surprising
then, that these minorities distrust America's institutions,
including the courts, and view them as "Anglo" bastions,
protectors of the status quo and particularly insensitive to their
needs. Since they feel that they cannot expect fair treatment,
many of them express outright distrust and cynicism with
regard to the law. Enactment of the Bilingual Courts Act can
help to dispel these attitudes. 2 7
It is interesting that the congressional intent was not to eradicate America's
discrimination against immigrants, but to dispel the immigrants' adverse
reaction to that discrimination.
To meet its dual purposes, Congress passed legislation that was more
comprehensive than all previous interpreter-service statutes combined.
Section 1827 authorizes federal district courtjudges, including magistrates
and bankruptcy judges, to appoint certified or otherwise qualified
interpreters when appropriate in all cases instituted by the United States,
including criminal and civil trials, grand jury, and habeas corpus
proceedings. 12 Interpreter services for parties shall be in the simultaneous
mode, and for witnesses, in the consecutive mode, unless otherwise ordered
by the court.' 29 The district court shall ascertain linguistic need for both
non-English-speakers and the hearing impaired. 3 ' If such need is found to
exist, the court shall appoint "the most available certified interpreter," and

use of translators in order to ensure that the quality of the translation does not fall
below a constitutionally permissible threshold.
United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1309 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
127. Senator John Tunney, BILINGUALCOURT ACT PROCEEDINGS, S. REP. No. 93-1185, at 1,
3-4 (1974) (precursor to the CIA).

128. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1), (j) (2000).
129. Id. at § 1827(k). Prior to the 1988 amendment, interpreter services were in the
consecutive mode, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

130. Id. at § 1827(d)(1).
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3
barring that, "an otherwise qualified interpreter."'
' An incompetent
32
replaced.
and
dismissed
be
shall
interpreter
There is also an express waiver provision. A party may waive
interpreter services, with the courts' approval. The waiver must be made
on the record, after consultation with counsel and include an explanation
by the court, through an interpreter, as to "the nature and effect of the
waiver."' 3 A party who has waived the use of a court-appointed
interpreter
3
1
choice.1
party's
the
of
interpreter
non-certified
a
may use
Lastly, the CIA directs the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to implement a program to "prescribe, determine, and
certify" interpreters for the federal courts. 35 The Director is also charged
with maintaining a master list of all certified and otherwise qualified
interpreters.3 36 Payment to interpreters for their services is also
prescribed.
The CIA does ameliorate interpreter availability in some ways. It
eliminates the indigency requirement the judiciary read into prior
provisions. 3 Interpreter appointments are to be made without regard to the
defendant's financial status-the costs to be borne by the federal courts.
Furthermore, the common law policy favoring the use of witnessinterpreters is abolished. Instead, there is an implied acknowledgement in
section 1827 that interpreters undertake different tasks of equal value in
district court. Nor are defendants obligated to formally request interpreter
services before they can be furnished. Rather, the district court may appoint
an interpreter suasponte. Finally, the statute makes it nearly impossible for
thejudge to ignore a defendant's demand for interpreter services, in that the

131. Id. The 1988 amendment substituted "qualified" for "competent." Id.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(e)(1) (2000).

133. Id. at § 1827(0(1).
Any individual other than a witness who is entitled to interpretation under
subsection (d) of this section may waive such interpretation in whole or in part.
Such a waiver shall be effective only if approved by the presiding judicial officer
and made expressly by such individual on the record after opportunity to consult
with counsel and after the presiding judicial officer has explained to such
individual, utilizing the services of the most available certified interpreter, or when
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, as determined by the presiding
judicial officer, the services of an otherwise competent interpreter, the nature and
effect of the waiver.
Id.
134. Id. at § 1827(0(2).
135. Id. at § 1827(b)(1).

136. Id. at § 1827(b)(3).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 902 (2d Cir. 1967).
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demand9 automatically triggers an investigation of the defendant's linguistic
t3

need.

These improvements notwithstanding, the CIA cures few of the more
serious defects of the previous statutes concerning waiver by silence, the
absence of statutory penalties or interlocutory review procedures, and
limited review on appeal. The CIA's dependence on judicial discretion is
a controversial holdover from earlier provisions. Interpreter access is not
a statutory "right"upon demand. While a defendant may ask for interpreter
services, the district court must independently recognize the defendant's
linguistic need for such services. 4° Thus, apart from making the request,
the defendant must "act out" or otherwise adequately exhibit sufficient
English language deficiency as the statutory predicate for interpreter access.
The district court, in turn, is not obligated to contemplate providing
interpreter services unless and until the defendant successfully
communicates the (ostensible) linguistic need for such services. 14 '
However, once that need is made known, the court shall probe the
defendant's language competency. From the results of that investigation,
the court must resolve the question of interpreter access. 42 Section 1827 is
therefore a fusion of two distinct discretionary decisions: (1) whether to
acknowledge and then look into the potential need, and (2) whether to
provide the available services as a result of that inquiry. In that fusion, the
first decision clearly predominates over the second, for if the potential need
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (2000).
140. See discussion infra Part III.
141. See discussion infra Part III.
142. Once the duty to investigate is triggered, whether or not a defendant meets the statutory
threshold of linguistic need would seemingly require an evidentiary hearing, by which the judge
could thoroughly explore the defendant's English language knowledge. Otherwise, the judge could
not fully assess the defendant's ability to maintain constitutional protections. Yet, Congress
expected district courts to base this decision routinely on counsels' suggestions and a brief colloquy
with the defendant at the courts' discretion.
While the judge has the ultimate responsibility in determining whether or not an
interpreter is required under this legislation, it is anticipated that counsel will alert
the judge's attention to the fact that an interpreter may be needed. It is anticipated
that the need for formal proceedings to make an initial determination of whether
the appointment of an interpreter is required will be minimal. Instead, we
anticipate that during discovery or other pretrial matters counsel for both parties
will be able to assess the language capability of a party. Upon agreement of both
attorneys and perhaps brief questioning by the judge of the party, the judge can
make the determination regarding appointment of an interpreter.
Court Interpreters Act, H.R. REP. No. 95-1687, at 6-7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4652, 4657. As a result, some district courts engage in perfunctory or haphazard questioning of
defendants and in close cases, deny such services by reason of competing economic concerns,
administrative expense, court calendar expediency, or shortage of qualified interpreters. See
discussion infra Part III.A.
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is never recognized or thoroughly evaluated, no duty to supply services
ever arises. 43
Commentators disapprove of the judicial discretion embodied in the
CIA because its exercise is neither linguistically informed nor objectively
controlled. It is their position that assessing a defendant's English
proficiency is a formidable task for which most judges are ill equipped.'"
They argue that section 1827 improperly leaves out any instructive
guidelines or testing mechanisms for a court to employ in gauging
linguistic need. As non-linguists, judges are incapable of independently
discerning such need and their decisions are therefore "inequitable" and
arbitrary. 4 ' However, such criticism is faulty in three respects. First, it is
not supported by any references to legal authority. None of these
commentators name any cases where a defendant would have benefited
from the court's use of either guidelines or testing to determine linguistic
need. Nor do they cite any decisions where a trial judge's exercise of
143. See Hrubec v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); see also discussion
infra Part I. A.
144. See Frankenthaler, supra note 99, at 54. "Judicial officers are not necessarily trained
linguists nor is it appropriate that we ask them to be so. Yet they must decide upon the linguistic
competency of parties and witnesses." Id.; Schulman, supra note 61, at 179. "Judges generally are
not equipped to determine whether a given defendant needs an interpreter." Id.; Alice Pousada,
Interpretingfor Language Minoritiesin the Courts,in GEORGETOWN UNIVERSrry ROUND TABLE
LANGUAGES ANDLINGUISTICS 1979: LANGUAGEINPUBICLIE 190 (James E. Alatis & G. Richard
Tucker eds., 1979). "The determination still rests in the long run with the discretion of the judge,
a man generally noted more for his legal acuity than his linguistic expertise." Id.
145. Pousada, supra note 144, at 195. "The basic problem with the dependence on the
discretionary powers of the judge is that most judges lack the necessary linguistic expertise and
standards with which to exercise those powers equitably." Beth Gottesman Lindie, Special Topics
in the Law ofEvidence: InadequateInterpretingServices in Courtsand the Rules ofAdmissibility
of Testimony on ExtrajudicialInterpretations,48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 399,405 (1993). "Although
the [Court Interpreters] Act provides guidelines, it has not been effective in providing qualified
interpreters to non-English speaking individuals." Id. See generally Miguel M6ndez, Lawyers,
Linguists, Story-Tellers, and Limited English-Speaking Witnesses, 27 N.M. L. REV. 77, 97-98
(1997) (suggesting the development of language assessment tests to assist the trial judge in
ascertaining the defendant's English knowledge). None of these commentators favor an automatic
evidentiary hearing as the way to investigate linguistic need. One even states it is a matter of
"linguistic competency" rather than evidence. Frankenthaler, supra note 99, at 53. However, the
requirement of conducting a formal examination of every defendant's English skills, even without
an interpreter request, would make the exercise of discretion easier and more open. No longer
would the defendant have to transmit sufficient hints of potential interpreter need to provoke a
judicial inquiry that could establish such need. In other words, a mandatory evidentiary hearing
would supplant the first discretionary aspect of the CIA, the decision that is'primarily dispositive
of adefendant's interpreter access. An evidentiary hearing is also the means by which a defendant
can preserve a record of English language fluency and comprehension for purposes of appeal.
Because the CIA does not include a presumption of interpreter need and a process for interlocutory
review, a defense counsel whose client has been refused interpreter access without an evidentiary
hearing is stymied. The attorney has no choice but to proceed with trial and hope the existing record
sufficiently evinces the defendant's interpreter need on appeal from an unfavorable verdict.
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discretion was "inappropriate," or unfairly deprived a defendant of an
interpreter.
Second, not only is their criticism rooted in speculation, but it is also
misplaced. Commentators take aim at the second (primary) discretionary
decision and overlook the impact of the first in more recent circuit court
opinions governing district court interpreter access.146 In assailing the trial
judge's capacity to assess linguistic need, commentators ignore the
predominant contention on appeal, which is thejudge's failure at the outset
to consider and then sufficiently explore the possibility of such need." 7 In
other words, at what point should a district court be put on notice of the
possibility that the defendant may require an interpreter and then be
expected to investigate thoroughly the level of the defendant's English
proficiency? The court's quandary is compounded by the fact that the
defendant typically knows some English and neglects to request interpreter
services. 48 The issue then becomes, even if the judge should have
furnished interpreter services, were those services waived by the
defendant's silence? Generally, appellate courts have held that any error in
not furnishing 49 an interpreter is waived or precluded in these
circumstances. 1
Third, in urging district courts to rely on external constraints to decide
linguistic need, commentators show a profound misunderstanding of
primary judicial discretion. Fundamental to this formulation of judicial
discretion are the notions of case-by-case flexibility and personal
investment by the trialjudge.'° Flexibility means that a district court is free
146. By "more recent circuit court opinions" I mean those opinions dealing with appeals
grounded, in part, on the CIA, which became effective Jan. 26, 1979.
147. See discussion infra Part IM.This makes analytical sense. Defendants who had or did not
have interpreter services but were acquitted are not going to appeal. Defendants who did or did not
request interpreter services but received them and were then convicted are going to appeal on
different grounds. Remaining defendants are either:. (1) those who failed to request an interpreter

in a timely fashion and were then convicted (their appeals contest the trial judge's failure to
investigate the defendant's linguistic need sua sponte), or (2) those defendants whose request for
interpreter services was denied, and they were then convicted (these defendants will contest the
court's assessment of their linguistic need in light of its investigation). Only this last group would
be the subject of the commentators' criticism.
148. See discussioninfra Part Ill.
149. See discussion infra Part H.

150.
The element of flexibility and choice in the process of adjudicating is precisely
what justice requires in many cases. Flexibility permits more compassionate and
more sensitive responses to differences which ought to count in applying legal
norms, but which get buried in the gross and rounded-off language of rules that
are directed at wholesale problems instead ofparticulardisputes. Discretion in this
sense allows the individualization of law and permits justice at times to be handmade instead of mass produced.
Rosenberg, supra note 80, at 642.
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to do justice by ascertaining and applying "the law of the land" according
to the particular facts then before it.' The trial judge's exercise of
discretion cannot be formulaic. It cannot involve the uniform processing of
uniquely situated individuals according to standardized criteria. 52
Moreover, the exercise of a discretionary decision is purely a judicial
enterprise. A district court is expected to decide based upon its own
experience and expertise. To require a trial judge instead to yield to or be
monitored by outside experts takes the decisionmaking process out of the
courtroom and removes the judge's inherent authority to regulate
proceedings. And, as a judicial enterprise, the exercise of primary
discretion necessitates the trial judge's personal investment. Discretionary
decisions require the district court's effort, consideration, and risk,
involving attention to distinct persons in specific circumstances at given
moments intheir lives.'53 In recognition of the work and worth of this
process, appellate courts traditionally defer to trial judges as "jurists on the
scene" in the best position to ascertain the facts.15 4 When ajudge's exercise
151.
Judicial discretion in its broadest meaning is that sense of right and justice from
which has sprung a vast array of legal and equitable principles never written in any
constitution, code or legislative act, but which nevertheless by the sanction and
approval of the courts have become component parts of the law of the land. In its
narrower sense it is the capacity of the individual judge presiding over a particular
court to perceive and apply to the facts of each case in judgment the law of the
land, so that in each case the rights of the parties under the facts of the case may
be declared and enforced according to the law of the land.
Scott v. Marley, 124 Tenn. 388, 394-95 (1911).
152.
Precise norms are not laid down, decision is intended to pivot on the
circumstances of the particular case, and each court along the route is free to reach
an independent conclusion as to the result called for by its own sound exercise of
discretion. Primary discretion bestows decision-liberatingchoice.
Rosenberg, supra note 80, at 638.
153. I do not disagree with some commentators' assertions that the CIA's perpetuation of
judicial discretion undercuts the statute's effectiveness. However, by attempting to systematize the
exercise of discretion, commentators cannot expect the decisionmaking process to be more
meaningful to the individual defendants. A more reasonable change would be to dispense with
judicial discretion entirely. In other words, trial judges should be precluded from deciding the
question of interpreter access. Rather, the defendants themselves should be allowed to determine
their own linguistic need. See discussion infra Part IV.
154. Friendly, supra note 79, at 759. "The most notable exception to full appellate review is
deference to the trial court's determination of the facts. The trial court's direct contact with the
witnesses places it in a superior position to perform this task." Id. Federal Rule Civil Procedure
52(a) provides that findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED.
R. CIV. P. 52(a). See generally United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817-19 (3d Cir. 1981).
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of discretion is attacked on appeal, it is seldom disturbed.1 55 As with
interpreter appointments, circuit courts generally review district courts'
primary discretion for clear error, or where the trial judge acted arbitrarily
or capriciously, thereby abusing that discretion. 56 It is rare that the exercise
of secondary discretion leads to reversal or even remand of the trial judge's
decision on interpreter access.' 57

III. How THE FEDERAL

JUDICIARY APPLIES THE FEDERAL COURT
INTERPRETER LAWS

Although there was a spate of appellate opinions in the 1990,s,58 the
common law construing a criminal defendant's interpreter access is
relatively sparse. Since January 26, 1979, the CIA's effective date, 159 only
one of the roughly thirteen cases"6 regarding the absence of interpreter
services has been reversed. 61 Two were remanded with instructions for the
trial judge to inquire into the sufficiency of the defendant's English skills
155. See discussion infra Part Im.
156. With some exceptions beyond the purview of this article, the "clear error" standard is
typically the standard of abuse of discretion employed by an appellate court in reviewing the trial
judge's decision on interpreter access. See United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 891-92 (2d Cir.
1967); Frankenthaler, supra note 99, at 51-52; Mdndez, supra note 145, at 90. After noting the
varied definitions of "abuse of discretion," Judge Friendly reasoned:
All it need mean is that, when judicial action is taken in a discretionary matter,
such action cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless it has a definite and
firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.
Friendly, supra note 79, at 764.
157. See discussion infraPart III.
158. Dated 1983 through 2000, the majority of these cases have been depublished or only
published in part. Mdndez, supra note 145, at 90,
159. Court Interpreters Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1827.
160. United States v. Mendoza, No. 95-1269, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12455, at *6 (6th Cir.
Apr. 17, 1996); Huitron v. United States, No. 94-55805,1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937, at *2-*5 (9th
Cir. Jan. 25,1995); Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047,1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (appeal ofdenial
of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion); United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174,1048 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Catalano, No. 91-50372,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20942, at *1-*3 (9th Cir. Aug. 21,1992);
United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d 505,507 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488,490
(5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Maniego, 710 F.2d 24,26 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Tapia,
631 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sanchez, No. 94-2866, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16725 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1994) (28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion); Hrubec v. United States,
734 F. Supp. 60,62 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (Habeas corpus petition from a federal conviction.); cf. United
States v. Torres, No. 94-1113, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 264, at *15-*22 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 1995);
United States v. Coronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d 1284, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1985).
161. United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1994) was reversed and
remanded on several grounds, including the district court's "insistence on evaluating [defendant's]
language skills in the course of the trial itself, and in front of the jury." Id.
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pursuant to the CIA. 62 My goal is not to second-guess the district courts in
the remaining fourteen cases. I do not maintain that their failure to provide
an interpreter constituted clear error. Instead, my interest is two-fold: First,
I am intrigued as to how these trial judges exercised their primary
discretion when it came to interpreter access. Second, I am curious as to
how appellate justices rationalized those decisions in applying their
secondary discretion. My concern is the extent to which the "foreigner"
meme controls both meanings of judicial discretion in the federal justice
system, especially following the Negron and Valladaresopinions.' 63
A. The "Foreigner"Meme and FederalCourtInterpreterAccess
The "foreigner" meme infiltrated the federal justice system by way of
a habeus corpus application filed in United States District Court by an
immigrant who had been convicted in state court of murder. When the
Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ of habeus corpus for Rogelio
Negron, its decision was heralded as advancing constitutional rights for
immigrant defendants.' 4 The Negron opinion was the first to grapple with
the related issues of the trial judge's duty to inform a non-English-speaking
defendant of available interpreter services and the defendant's waiver of
such services by silence. The court of appeals reasoned that because of
Negron's English deficiency, he had been unaware of and thus unable to
secure his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the
proceedings.' 6 Therefore, the court held, to afford this defendant his
constitutional protections, the trial judge was obligated to apprise him of
the interpreter services available and then to provide them.' 6' The court
declared that Negron's silence could not have constituted "passive
acquiescence" to the absence of such services when he did not know of
their existence. 67 In other words, Negron could not have intended "a
knowing, intelligent waiver" of rightsl about
which he was ignorant due to
8
competence.
English
of
lack
his total
162.
631 F.2d
163.
164.

United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Tapia,
1207, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1980).
Negron, 434 F.2d at 386; Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564 (1lth Cir. 1989).
Indeed, the Second Circuit described its own opinion as having "important precedential

value." Negron, 434 F.2d at 387; see also Carlos A. Astiz, A Comment on JudicialInterpretation
of the FederalCourt InterpretersAct, 14 JUST. SYS. 1. 103, 103-09 (1990).

165. Negron, 434 F.2d at 389.
166. Id. at 390-91.
167. Id. at 390.
168. Id. It has been held that the constitutional prerequisite to a valid waiver is "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of the] ... right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938). Indeed, unless the judge explains to the non-English speaking defendant, through an
interpreter, that interpreter services are available, the defendant cannot possibly choose to forego
those services within the meaning of Johnson v. Zerbst. At most, the defendant has forfeited rather
than waived the constitutional or statutory right to an interpreter. See United States v. Olano, 507
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The precedential value of the Negron opinion is fairly limited.
Undoubtedly, it has given those defendants with no English skills ready
access to an interpreter in district court. However, the latest fourteen
appeals contesting the absence of interpreter services have involved
defendants with semi-English fluency who, like Negron, never demanded
them at trial. Unlike Negron, these defendants (apparently) never otherwise
demonstrated the linguistic need for such services. For them, the Negron
opinion has been devastating in both the district and circuit courts in two
respects. First, the defendants found themselves competing for the
appointment of an interpreter against what has become an idealized
prototype of linguistic need. Second, they discovered their partial English
proficiency, coupled with their silence, rendered the trial judge exempt
from investigating and assessing their linguistic need.
The only fact about the defendant Negron that was determinative of his
interpreter access was his inability to speak or understand English. Yet, the
decision spins a sympathetic tale of an impoverished Puerto Rican native,
with only a sixth grade education, who had twice immigrated to the United
States, each time staying merely a few months as an agricultural laborer.' 69
During his second visit he was arrested for the crime of murder. 170 While
true, these additional facts relate to Negron's identity or background and
not to his issue of linguistic need. A non-native speaker's English
knowledge is not necessarily derivative of his country of origin, education
level, and time spent in the United States. And, even if it were, such facts
could only explain the reason for the speaker's degree of proficiency, not
actually demonstrate it. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit insisted on using
these facts to depict Negron as a helpless innocent, "thrown into a criminal
trial as his initiation to our trial system.'' The court reasoned that because
Negron was newly arrived, with probable plans for the briefest stay,
relatively uneducated and unemployed, his language deficiency was to be
expected and accommodated by the federal justice system.'72 The Negron
opinion is the first example ofjudicial "immigrant profiling" in the context
of interpreter access. An immigrant who fits the Negron profile is
U.S. 725, 731 (1993); discussion infra Part IV.
169. See Negron, 434 F.2d at 387-88.
170; Id. at 387.
171. Id. at390.
Nor are we inclined to require that an indigent, poorly educated Puerto Rican
thrown into a criminal trial as his initiation to our trial system, come to that trial
with a comprehension that the nature of our adversarial processes is such that he
is in peril of forfeiting even the rudiments of a fair proceeding unless he insists
upon them.

Id.
172. See id

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss2/2

30

Dery: Amadou Diallo and the "Foreigner" Meme: Interpreting the Applicat
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETER LAWS

presumed to have no knowledge of English, thereby allowing the judge to
dispense with the task of actually investigating and assessing linguistic
need.'73 Moreover, the Negron profile depicts the immigrant who has a
right to interpreter services as a "victim." In other words, interpreter access
hinges on the defendant's perceived "blamelessness" in needing them. This
connection between interpreter worthiness and absence of fault is
suggestive of the "foreigner" meme in reverse. In effect, the "foreigner"
meme has been introduced into the federal justice system in the guise of a
negative implication. Although the Negron prototype is both emotionally
charged and factually irrelevant to an immigrant's actual linguistic need,
it is one against which other defendants have inevitably been compared, to
their detriment. Following the Negron opinion, and without reference to it,
some circuit courts have recited the levels of education, employment, as
well as length of stay of the defendant, without comment, before affirming
the conviction. 74 In Gonzalez v. United States 75 the defendant pled guilty
to three federal offenses and was sentenced to 168 months. 176 His motion
to vacate or modify his sentence was denied. 7 7 Miguel Gonzalez then filed
an appeal in the Ninth Circuit, claiming he did not understand the nature
and cause of the charges against him within the meaning of his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights because he was not furnished an interpreter.'
Gonzalez never sought an interpreter in district court. He claimed his
attorney's failure to demand one constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. 79 At the outset, the Ninth Circuit detailed the defendant's
education and employment history, and his length of stay in the United
States, some of which had been known by the district court.180 The court of
appeals noted that Gonzalez was a naturalized citizen, had worked in a
variety of businesses, and was buying his own home at the time of his
plea.' The court eventually affirmed the trial judge's denial of the
defendant's motion. The inference to be drawn from opinions like
173. This approach is also contrary to logic, which would require an inquiry into the
defendant's actual competence that could then be then accounted for by the Negron facts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cheng, No. 99-30073, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4243, at *2-*3 (9th Cir. Mar. 16,
2000).
174. See, e.g., Huitron v. United States, No. 94-55805, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937, at *5
(9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1995) ("Huitron has been a legal resident of this country for twenty years and
attended high and vocational training schools in this country."); Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d
1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1990) ('"he
testimony reflected that although a Mexican citizen, Perez had lawfully resided in the United States
for 19 years."). But see Cheng, No. 99-30073, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4243, at *2.
175. 33 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994).
176. Id. at 1048.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1050.
181. Id.
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Gonzalez is that immigrants whose educational and employment levels and
residence in the United States exceed those of the Negron profile are
deemed to know enough English to safeguard their own constitutional
rights. It is an inference that displaces the trial judge's obligation to be alert
to such defendants' potential linguistic need. Circuit courts regard them as
incapable of showing viable need even if thejudge had opted to investigate
it.
Additionally, circuit courts have "faulted" immigrant defendants not
matching the Negron profile for failing to object to the lack of interpreter
services, or to request or otherwise show the linguistic need for them, when
the defendants do know some English. It is a judicial perception of the
immigrants' "blameworthiness" more in keeping with the "foreigner"
meme and of the immigrants' silence as a conscious choice. In affirming
the defendant's conviction, the Ninth Circuit remarked in UnitedStates v.
Acevedo-Toscano that he had "neither requested an interpreter nor objected
to the lack of an interpreter during plea proceedings." 18 This observation
typifies those of appellate courts facing partially English proficient
defendants who neglected "to speak to" their linguistic need in district
court. 83 It signals the unstated, but clear belief among courts of appeal that,
unlike Negron, these defendants must pay the price of an implied waiver
for keeping silent. 84 The courts' conclusion, that in failing to speak the
immigrants have intentionally relinquished constitutional rights, necessarily
springs from several underlying presumptions. Among them is that, had the
182. United States v. Acevedo-Toscano, No. 99-50064,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2589 (9th Cir.
Feb. 18, 2000).
183. See United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444,446-47 (1st Cir. 1996); notes 200-09, infraand
accompanying text. "Here, an interpreter appeared to be available. There is no indication that
[defendant] ever requested the assistance ofan interpreter." Huitron v. United States, No. 94-55805,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937, at *5 (9th Cir. Jan. 25,1995); see also United States v. Sanchez, C.A.
No. 94-2866, Crim. No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1994).
In addition, neither defendant nor his wife requested that a certified interpreter be
appointed nor claimed during the hearing that the wife was not qualified or unable
to interpret the proceedings. Nor did defendant or his wife claim at any time
during the resentencing hearing that defendant did not comprehend any part of the
proceedings. In short, there was no evidence before the Court that indicated that
defendant's ability to understand English based both on his own knowledge and
the assistance of his common law wife was so deficient as to "inhibit"
comprehension of the proceedings.
Id184. It is interesting that none of these courts declare that silence is to be understood as an
abandonment of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Indeed, some courts of appeal undoubtedly
"protest too much" in pointedly asserting that the defendant's silence was not determinative of the
appeal: "In addition, although his lack of objection is not dispositive, Gonzalez never indicated to
the court that he was experiencing major difficulty, despite the opportunities afforded him."
Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994).
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defendants requested or otherwise exhibited the need for interpreter
services, they would have obtained them. 5 This presumption is false in
that no cases have afforded a partially English-proficient defendant
unmediated access to interpreter services on demand.'86 The statutory
predicate for interpreter assistance is the finding, upon judicial inquiry, that
a non-primary English speaker's skills are so deficient as to inhibit
comprehension of the proceedings or communication with court or
counsel.'8 7 A demand for interpreter assistance merely notifies the district
court that the defendant's potential linguistic need should be explored. If
the court finds the defendant has no need, it provides no services."88
Moreover, should this defendant display obvious English problems, yet
neglect to demand interpreter services, the likelihood the defendant will
procure them is even less. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted section
1827 as mandating an inquiry whenever a defendant has a language
difficulty 8 9 And, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that the CIA
compels the district court to make its findings on the record following an
inquiry to enlighten the appellate court and to protect the defendant.190
185. The speciousness of this presumption I discuss immediately, because it factors into the
Negron-induced process for resolving interpreter access. The other presumptions are (1) these
defendants had been aware of the availability of interpreter services, and (2) because they could
gauge their own English proficiency, these defendants (or their attorney) invariably would have
requested interpreter services or otherwise exhibited the need for them if such services had been

desired. These latter presumptions I cover in the next part entitled "Linguistic Need" and
"Blameworthiness," because they largelyunderlie Valladaresv.UnitedStates,871 F.2d 1564(1 lth
Cir. 1989). None of the presumptions support the appellate courts' tendency to view the silence of
these defendants on interpreter access as tantamount to a passive waiver of their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.
186. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
188. See supranotes 140-41 and accompanying text.
189. "Section 1827 does place on the trial court a mandatory duty to inquire as to the need for
an interpreter when a defendant has difficulty with English." Valladares,871 F.2d at 1565; see also
United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289,1293-94(10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d
1207, 1209.(5th Cir. 1980).
190. Osuna, 189 F.3d at 1293-94.
We cannot determine from this record whether use of an interpreter would have
alleviated the [defendant's language] problem because the duty imposed by
Section 1827 of the Act to inquire as to the need for an interpreter was not
observed. The trial judge made no inquiries or findings as to the need for an
interpreter, although the repeated language difficulties suggested the possible need
for an interpreter.... In sum, due to the difficulties which became apparent during
the trial proceedings here, it was the trial judge's duty to inquire into the possible
need to obtain the services of an interpreter under the Court Interpreters Act. ...
Since these protections were not extended to him, we must remand for findings,
and if necessary further proceedings in the trial court to make those findings.
Id. (citations omitted); Tapia, 831 F.2d at 1209 ("[Ihe Court Interpreters Act of 1978 makes it
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Nevertheless, some courts of appeal have created a "loophole" that
could allow trial judges to avoid undertaking an inquiry. The loophole
pertains to the judge's duty to be sensitive to the possibility of the
defendant's linguistic need. At what point should it be obvious to the
district court that a defendant's English deficiency could compromise his
constitutional rights? When should the defendant's language difficulty
automatically trigger a section 1827 investigation? Generally, appellate
courts do not consider the defendant's status as a non-primary English
speaker to be enough to precipitate an inquiry by trial judges.'91
Nevertheless, some district courts, when faced with a non-native speaker,
habitually ask the defendant if an interpreter is desired. In UnitedStates v.
Torres, the trial judge directly asked the defendant if he "could speak
English." Although Eleno Torres responded affirmatively, he later changed
his mind and requested an interpreter through his attorney. 1 2 The trial
judge then immediately appointed an interpreter. 93
The presence of a non-primary English speaker prompts other district
courts to examine thoroughly the defendant's linguistic need and to make
detailed findings in support of their discretion. In United States v. Cheng,
the defendant was convicted of exporting and attempting to export
munitions without proper licensing.4 On appeal, George Cheng contended
that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to extend to him
interpreter assistance. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction after
reviewing the judge's finding that Cheng's "working knowledge of
English" was sufficient to dispense with the appointment of an
interpreter.' 9 This finding resulted from an extensive hearing on Cheng's
English competence.
[A]ll three of Defendant's trial interpreters testified that he
waived off their translations so that he could listen to the
English-language testimony himself. He answered questions
at trial without waiting for an interpretation. He spoke English
with his lawyer and with the court. Defendant's business
associates testified that they conducted business with him in
English and even discussed in English topics such as politics
and philosophy. Defendant wrote letters in English and
testified that he had read and understood various Englishincumbent upon a trial Court to make certain findings on the record, which are lacking in this
case.").
191. Hrubec, 734 F. Supp. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[T]he fact that a defendant's primary
language is something other than English does not ipsofacto create the duty to inquire of the need

for an interpreter.").
192. No. 94-1113, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 264, at *16-*17 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 1995).

193. Id.
194. No. 99-30073, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4243, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2000).
195. Id.at *2.
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language documents. Defendant began to study English at the
age of 13 and has lived in the United States since 1982.1'9
However, there are trial judges who refrain from investigating the
defendant's linguistic need by ignoring or discounting a defendant's
unmistakable language difficulty. Some judges never acknowledge the
defendant's English deficiency."9 Trial records reveal the silence of both
the district court and the defendant on the question of interpreter
availability. Other judges conduct a brief colloquy, having the defendant
answer a few "yes/no" questions,' or they ask the defendant to "speak up"
should any comprehension or communication problems arise during the
proceedings.' 99 In all of these cases, when the defendants later dispute the
omission of interpreter services on appeal, circuit courts reject the notion
of reversible error. They conclude the trial judge could not have been
mindful of any potential linguistic need from the defendants' behavior
alone. The onus was therefore on the defendants to inform the unsuspecting
judge of any language problems to be investigated. However, according to
most courts of appeal, because the defendants never demanded interpreter
assistance nor objected to its absence, they could not have reasonably
envisioned an investigation by the trial judge. In other words, the district
court made its first discretionary decision, that any English problems were
not worthy of investigation. Therefore, its second discretionary decision,
whether to provide interpreter services, was unnecessary.
This rationale among appellate courts has produced some surprising
decisions. One remarkable case is UnitedStates v. Arthurs, in which ajury
convicted the defendant of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute
and importing cocaine, both federal offenses. 2° He was sentenced to sixtythree months of imprisonment and appealed from the judgment20 ' On
appeal, Lloyd Arthurs asserted that: (1) he had asked the trial judge to have
196. Id.
197. United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444,446 (1st Cir. 1996).
198. Gonzalezv. United States, 33 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d
505, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1991).

199. United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1990).
At his initial appearance before the magistrate Perez indicated that he had some
difficulty with the English language. The magistrate pointedly inquired whether
Perez understood the proceedings. Perez responded: "I understand everything so
far." The magistrate then advised Perez that "if you have any difficulty in
understanding what's going on, stop and let us know so that we can do something
because we can get a translator to assist you." Perez made no protestation of
difficulty or request for assistance by a translator.
Id.
200. Arthurs, 73 F.3d at 445.
201. Id. at 446.
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his Jamaican-English testimony translated "into a form of English more
easily understood by the jury;" and (2) he "did not understand some of the
questions put to him when he testified."'202 Arthurs argued that the district
court's subsequent refusal to provide him an interpreter when he testified
violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. °3 The First Circuit
remarked that the record contained neither a request for interpreter
assistance nor an objection to its omission (nor did the record show any
findings by the trial judge as to the defendant's English skills). However,
the court of appeals opted to address Arthurs' claim because the
government conceded that defense counsel had demanded an interpreter in
a chamber's conference during trial. 2°1 In reviewing the record, the First
Circuit observed that defense counsel had made several references in open
20 5
court to the possibility thejury would not understand Arthurs' testimony.
The appellate court also recognized the defendant was unable to read and
write. 16 Finally it noted that during his testimony, Arthurs seemed to have
"answered for the most part responsively, although he [had] occasionally
misunderstood and needed to have a question repeated."207 Nevertheless,
the First Circuit affirmed Arthurs' conviction, in part, due to defense
counsel's failure to object to the lack of interpreter services on the ground
that Arthurs was "suffer[ing] from comprehension problems so severe 2as8
to deny him due process or the right to a fair and impartial trial.
Consequently, the district court was left "without notice of any claim that
language difficulties bothered the defendant to the extent now claimed on
appeal. Had the court been so notified, it could have made further inquiry
and, if necessary, taken steps to deal with the alleged problem. 2 " So, not
even defense counsel's witness interpreter request nor his client's
comprehension and communication problems were enough to convey
202. Id. at 446-47.

203. Id. at 447.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 447 n.2.
For example, defense counsel explained in opening argument, "Mr. Lloyd Arthurs
is a Jamaican National, they speak English but during this trial you will realize
that the (sic] their English is not every time so easily understandable." When
defendant took the stand, counsel stated, "I will appreciate that all your answers
try to be as clear and slow as possible.... For the members of the Jury to clearly
understand your testimony." And in closing arguments, defense counsel noted that
the jury may have had some difficulty understanding defendant's speech, and
reiterated key aspects of his testimony.
Id.
206. See id. at 447.
207. Id.
208. Id.

209. Id.
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Arthurs' potential linguistic need to the judge. Apparently, the request of
defendant or defense counsel must also specify the proper kind of
interpreter
(here witness, proceedings, or both) for the judge to consider
it.210
The Gonzalez opinion provides a related example of the lower court
downplaying language problems that are evident in sua sponte colloquies
between the defendant and the bench.21 First, the district court magistrate
and then the judge asked the defendant some yes or no questions because
they both "quickly perceive[d] that Gonzalez, whose primary language
[was] Spanish, had some difficulties with English. 21 2 Nevertheless, both
jurists felt that Gonzalez' English problems were not "major" enough to
210. But see United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999), where the
defendant was convicted for unlawfully possessing firearms and other armaments. On appeal, Felix
Osuna claimed the trial judge violated section 1827 in failing to appoint an interpreter for him. Id.
at 1291. The language problems that developed during trial were "from both the rapidity of Osuna's
testimony, and his basic Spanish language usage." Id. at 1292. The prosecutor requested witness
interpreter services for defendant because the court reporterjudge, and perhaps the jury, were not
entirely able to understand him. Id.at 1292-93. Yet, "[t]he trial judge made no inquiries or findings
as to the need for an interpreter, although the repeated language difficulties suggested the possible
need for an interpreter." Id. at 1293. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for the trial judge to
"determine from the trial record whether lack of an interpreter inhibited Osuna's comprehension
of the proceedings or his ability to assist in presenting his case to the jury." Id.
211. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 1994); see alsoUnited States
v. Febus etal,218 F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cit. 2000); United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d 505,507-08 (7th
Cir. 199 1) (upholding determination of a knowing and intelligent waiver of an interpreter even
though an interpreter was needed duringjudge's colloquy with defendant); United States v. Signo,
C.A. No. 97-2312, Crim. A. No. 96-562-1, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14470 at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16
1997).
212. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1050. At Gonzalez' arraignment:
Court: Do you understand?
Gonzalez: Yeah, little bit.
Court: What is your problem, language problem?
Gonzalez: Well, no. I don't know how to read that much. I understand. I
understand.
At Gonzalez' change of plea hearing...:
Court: What did you do? Did you work with other people to buy drugs and sell
them?
Gonzalez: I used the telephone.
Court: In addition to using the phone, what did you do?
Gonzalez: I worked with Forcelledo.
Court: Did you sell drugs to people?
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Did you deliver drugs to people?
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Was that drug cocaine?
Gonzalez: Yes.
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inhibit his comprehension or communication within the meaning of the
CIA.21 3 As a consequence, no further factual inquiry was warranted.2 14 The

Ninth Circuit agreed, adding that "[t]he defendant's answers were
consistently responsive, if brief and somewhat inarticulate, and he only
occasionally consulted his attorney. In addition, although his lack of
objection is not dispositive, Gonzalez never indicated to the court that he
was experiencing major difficulty, despite the opportunities afforded
him." 2' Once again, a court of appeal excused a lower court's dismissive
reaction to a defendant's obviously impaired English skills. However,
accompanying the Gonzalez opinion is Judge Stephen Reinhardt's vigorous
and cogent dissent.2 6 He strongly chastised the district court magistrate and
judge for engaging in "cursory, half-hearted, and casual questioning" that
was meant to eliminate the appearance of defendant's potential need or "to
21 Judge Reinhardt argued
compensate for Gonzalez' inability to speak.""
that by eliciting responses to a series of "short, simple questions," the
jurists hoped to sidestep the necessity of a full investigation.2 8 He then
castigated the Gonazlez majority for allowing the district court to read into
the CIA a distinction between "major language problem" (i.e., a potential
linguistic need to investigate for probable interpreter appointment) and
"minor language problem" (i.e., no potential linguistic need to
investigate).21 9 Judge Reinhardt emphasized that the statute makes no such
-distinction because Congress did not wish to manufacture arbitrary and
possibly harmful differences among those who are non-primary English
speakers.' "Congress mandated the appointment of interpreters whenever
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 1051.
216. Id. at 1052-54 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
217. Id. at 1053 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
218. Id. (Reinhardt, J.,dissenting). "A district judge cannot compensate for his failure to
appoint an interpreter by asking the defendant only extremely basic questions." Id. (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
219. Id. (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
The only question and the sole permissible inquiry, in the case of defendants like
Gonzalez is whether the defendant's comprehension is impaired for purposes of
thejudicial proceeding. Any otherinquiry is improper. Had the majority examined
the language and purpose ofthe statute in a more attentive manner, it surely would
not have ignored such a clear congressional mandate.
Id. at 1052 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (Judge Reinhardt urged his colleagues to apply a de novo
standard of appellate review rather than a "clear error" standard.).
220. IU (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
There is absolutely no indication in the statute or its legislative history that a
defendant must have a "major" language problem to be granted an interpreter, and
the district court erred in reading such an additional requirement into the Act....
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a 'language-handicapped' defendant's comprehension of the proceedings
is impaired because Congress concluded that the appointment of an
interpreter
represents 'a fundamental premise of fairness and due process
22 1
all."'
for
Judge Reinhardt's point is well taken, but he does not go far enough.
Subdividing partially proficient speakers into groups tends to undermine
the exercise of discretion as a judge's personal investment in the fate of a
particular defendant.' Once categorized with a major or minor language
difficulty, defendants are no longer individualized. As part of a group, their
personal idiosyncratic linguistic need is no longer relevant in considering
linguistic need. Judges do not have to be attentive to the more subtle
English deficiencies uniquely characteristic of a certain defendant in a
specific case. 3 Rather, they may be tempted to compare the current
defendant to similarly situated defendants in previous cases (in terms of
superficial and not necessarily relevant facts like age, education and
employment levels, and length of residence) and to dispense with any
meaningful factual inquiry.22'
The upshot of opinions like Arthurs and Gonzalez is that appellate
courts use the silence of a semi-English-fluent defendant as retroactive
justification for the trial judge's disregard of the defendant's
comprehension and communication problems. As a result, the burden of
seeking and then legitimizing interpreter access falls on the defendant,
without any corresponding burden on the judge to be conscious of and then
inquire into the defendant's potential linguistic need. It is a peculiar irony
of the federal justice system that English-deficient defendants must
articulate their desire for interpreter services before their right to such
services can be assessed. Another irony is that interpreter assistance is not
guaranteed even for those defendants who do request it.

Many people may be capable of speaking enough rudimentary English to function
at a very basic level in this country but lack the ability to comprehend complex
criminal proceedings. Others may speak English so fluently that, even though
English represents their second language, they can follow the most complicated
of criminal proceedings. Congress presumably had the latter group in mind when
it required that language difficulties "inhibit" the defendant's comprehension of
the proceedings for an interpreter to be appointed.
Id. (Reinhardt, I., dissenting).
221. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
222. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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B. "LinguisticNeed" and "Blameworthiness"
With Negron, the "foreigner" meme gained a foothold in the federal
justice system. However, thanks to Valladares v. United States,2 1 it
became a driving force in resolving appeals challenging the absence of
interpreter services. Suddenly, essential to appellate review was the reason
these semi-English-fluent defendants had kept silent during the
proceedings. Why had they not raised the issue of interpreter access to the
trial judge? In effect, circuit courts began to question and then read into the
defendants' silence certain motives that became determinative of their
appeal. Nelson Valladares did not dispute his interpreter's competency
when he was tried for possession and distribution of marijuana. 6 He was
ultimately convicted. 2z Valladares moved to have his, conviction
overturned, alleging newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance
of counsel. 8 Testimony was also taken on the adequacy of his interpreter
on the first day of trial at the ensuing hearing.2 9 The district court rejected
Valladares' initial claims but failed to consider the additional interpreter
issue. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for a
determination of whether the CIA had been violated. 2 ' The district court
subsequently found that the section 1827 provisions had been met, a
decision from which Valladares then appealed.231
In an opinion authored by Justice Lewis Powell (then retired and sitting
by designation),
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's
2321
,
findings. Justice Powell thought it "significant" that Valladares "made
no objection to the adequacy of his interpreter at trial," warning that "to
allow a defendant to remain silent throughout the trial and then upon being
found guilty, to assert a claim of inadequate translation would be an open
invitation to abuse. 2 33 Justice Powell never defined what he meant by
"abuse." Nor did he cite any authority that could help explain his
admonition. However, People v. Ramos, 234 then a well-known 1970 New
York state court decision, contains comparable language which may clarify
225. 871 F.2d 1564, 1564-66 (11th Cir. 1989).
226. d at 1566.
227. Id. at 1565.
228. Id. (basing Valadares' motion on 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
229. Id. On that day only, Valladares was assisted by a local Spanish-speaking attorney. Id.
Thereafter, the defendant conceded that he relied on a "satisfactory" interpreter. Id. at 1565 n. 1.
230. Id. at 1565.
231. Id. According to one commentator, neither interpreter had been federally certified, and
the attorney-interpreter only provided Valladares summaries of the trial evidence. Astiz, supra note
164, at 106.
232. Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1566. "We affirm the district court's holding that [Valladares']
understanding of the trial and the assistance of his counsel were adequate under constitutional and

statutory standards." Id. at 1564-65.
233. Id. at 1566.
234. 258 N.E.2d 197, 198-99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
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Justice Powell's concern. In that case, Jesus Ramos moved for a writ of
error coram nobis, claiming he had been denied his constitutional right to
a fair trial because he did not understand the proceedings due to language
problems. 235 During his trial for narcotics possession, Ramos demanded an
interpreter but only to translate his Spanish-language testimony.2 36 In an
opinion foreshadowing the previously discussed federal circuit court
rationale in Valladares,23 the New York appellate judge affirmed Ramos'
conviction.238 Judge Jasen wrote in part:
The right to an interpreter, however, may be waived where a
defendant, or his attorney, fails to call to the attention of the
trial court, in some appropriate manner, the fact that he does
not possess sufficient understanding of the English language.
Where, as here, a defendant is adequately represented by
competent counsel, and despite numerous opportunities to do
so, fails to inform the court about any inability to understand
the English language, he cannot be heard to complain in a
collateral attack that his conviction was secured without due
process of law.239
Using a rationale adumbrating Justice Powell's opinion, Judge Jasen
concluded,
Otherwise, it would be possible for a defendant to remain
silent throughout the trial, and take a chance of a favorable
verdict-failing in which, he could secure a new trial upon the
ground that he did not understand the language in which the
testimony was given. The absurdity of such a proposition is
self-evident.m
This was assuredly the "abuse" Justice Powell later anticipated
occurring in the federal justice system. He was afraid that if partially
English proficient defendants were not subjected to an implied waiver for
not speaking, they could then "trick" judges into granting them a new trial
even though their conviction had been proper.24 ' To Justice Powell, their
apparent language difficulty occulted an actual English fluency.

235. Id. at 198.

236. Id.
237. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
238. Ramos, 258 N.E.2d at 199.

239. Id. at 198 (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 198-99.
241. But see UnitedStates ex rel.Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970), a
Second Circuit opinion binding on New York state courts, decided October 15, 1970. Ramos, 258
N.E.2d at 197, was decided April 9, 1970.
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Other circuit courts have had similar fears. In four of the appellate
decisions citing the Valladares opinion to support an implied waiver,242
two of them quoted Justice Powell's warning.2 4 3 The cases add a darker
dimension to the evolving "foreigner" meme, an aspect of
"blameworthiness" that is more menacing and complicated. Appellate
courts still view immigrants as solely responsible for preferring to remain
silent and for generating the consequences of an implied waiver. However,
the Valladares opinion and its progeny also ascribe to the immigrants'
silence a perfidious motive. The decisions construe the immigrants' failure
to speak as an attempt to exploit the justice system for an undeserved right
(to a new trial). 2' This view reflects more than the belief that immigrants
simply oppose assimilating into the dominarit culture. Rather, it suggests
they actively intend to sabotage dominant culture values and institutions.
Furthermore, reviewing courts fear that by their efforts immigrants will
achieve greater rather than equal access to constitutional rights if the
dominant culture is not hyper-vigilant. In effect, the stigma of danger and
dishonesty imputed to immigrants in society245 has filtered into the justice
system.'
The Valladaresopinion, and by extension the "foreigner" meme, stems
from two presumptions that supposedly account for the silence of semiEnglish-fluent immigrant defendants. First, that these defendants had
known that interpreter assistance was potentially available to them. Second,
that if they had wanted interpreter assistance, the defendants (or their
242. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rosa,
946 F.2d 505,508 (7thCir. 1991); United States v. Signo,C.A. No. 97-2312, Crim. A. No. 96-5621, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14470, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1997); Hrubec v. United States, 734 F.
Supp..60, 67 (E.D.N.Y 1990).
243. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1051; Signo, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14470, at *7.
244. Itis interesting that the fear was not that the defendant's silence would lead to interpreter
services which the defendant did not merit in the initial trial.
245. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
246. And, because these immigrants are also convicted criminals, the system's negative
perception of them tends to be reinforced. In other words, immigrants may also discover that their
earlier adjudication of guilt bootstraps appellate review of whether they were entitled to interpreter
assistance during lower court proceedings. In UnitedStates v. Sanchez, C.A. No. 94-2866, Crim.
A. No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 16725, at *1(E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1994), the defendant pled
guilty to narcotics offenses for which the district court sentenced him to a term of 121 months
imprisonment. He was offered a sentence reduction in exchange for information against a co-felon.
Id. at *2. However, Oscar Sanchez later transmitted exculpatory information to the prosecution that
proved to be false. Id. The court reduced his sentence to 90 months. Id. Sanchez moved the district
court to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, contending he was denied a qualified interpreter
at his re-sentencing hearing. Id. at *2-*3. He alleged that both the CIA provisions and his due
process rights had thus been violated. Id. at *3-*4. In denying Sanchez' motion, the district court
commented that the defendant never indicated his inability to understand English to the sentencing
judge. Id. at *6. The court then surmised that "defendant only raises this claim at this time because
he is not satisfied with the amount of time his sentence was reduced." Id. Sanchez' reason for
appealing his sentence has no bearing on its constitutionality.
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attorney) invariably would have requested it or objected to its omission.
Based on these presumptions, appellate courts perceive the defendants'
silence as the product of an informed choice justifying the determination
of an implied waiver. However, because this perception is colored by
suspicion, it is not necessarily accurate. The intellectual by-product of such
skewed understanding is the appellate courts' refusal to entertain more
likely explanations of the defendants' silence. Immigrants may not request
interpreter services due to lack of knowledge. The district court is not
compelled to advise them of interpreter availability unless and until they
convey the requisite linguistic need.247 In effect, unless informed by their
defense counsel, the defendants may be unaware of interpreter access,
especially at the commencement of proceedings. Even if they know they
can seek interpreter assistance, these defendants may choose to forego it for
reasons other than the lack of desire. For example, the immigrants may fear
requesting interpreter services, misunderstand the availability of such
services, or misjudge their own English proficiency. This last possibility
arises when non-native speakers are comfortable with their English skills
in daily situations but lose confidence in their proficiency in the intense and
hostile courtroom environment. 2
Of course, circuit courts labeling such silence an implied waiver are
also influenced by the defense attorney's failure to speak.249 Yet judicial
reliance on counsels' behavior as a gauge of their client's linguistic need
is a dubious practice. Why should the attorney be any more adept at
judging the defendant's English skills than the trial judge? Moreover, some
247. United States v. Barrios, 457 F.2d 680,682 (9th Cir. 1972). Barrioswas later criticized
on other grounds by UnitedStates v. Valencia, 669 F.2d 37, 38 (2nd Cir. 1980). However, should
the court offer the defendant an interpreter, the court is only obligated to make the offer once. See
United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1990).
248. In this regard the following comments are persuasive:
English language difficulty hinders the right of equal access to the criminal justice
system. Even if a defendant, victim, or witness speaks some English, he or she
may not communicate or comprehend English adequately for a legal proceeding.
In order to avoid significant misunderstandings, a hurdle of constitutional
importance, the defendant or witness may need an interpreter. This is not due
solely to the legal terms and more sophisticated forms of English used in the
courtrooms, but also because many persons who use English as a second language
have difficulty speaking or comprehending English in a pressured or highly
charged situation, or in a location that is not part of their common experience,
such as in a courtroom or at a police station.
Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 35, at 194.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Acevedo-Toscano, No. 99-50064, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
2589, at *2-*4 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2000); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444,446-47 (1st Cir.
1996); Huitron v. United States, No. 94-55805,1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937, at *4-*5 (9th Cir. Jan.
30, 1995); United States v. Sanchez, C.A. No. 94-2866, Crim. No. 91-00148, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16725, at *3-*8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1994).
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defense counsels refrain from requesting interpreter services for
unexplained and inexplicable reasons. Nevertheless, their silence is deemed
acceptable on appellate review 0° Finally, the constitutional rights
implicated by interpreter access are personal to the defendant and cannot
be waived by defense counsel. Two appellate courts have rejected the
notion of an interpreter waiver by either counsel or court.2" Instead, they
held that for a waiver to be valid it must comply with CIA provisions,
mandating an express waiver by the defendant. 2 Medina Tapia appealed
his conviction for conspiring to transport unlawfully undocumented aliens
into the United States, alleging section 1827 had dictated the appointment
of a Spanish/English interpreter for trial.253 The Fifth Circuit commented
that defense counsel was Spanish/English bilingual, the defendant had been
arraigned through an interpreter, and while an interpreter had been
available for trial, defense counsel never moved for an interpreter to sit
with the defendant at trial.' The court of appeals held that Tapia's use of
an interpreter for arraignment had put the judge on notice of his potential
linguistic need that should have been investigated.255 The silence of Tapia's
lawyer was not dispositive of his client's interpreter access. 256 If thejudge's
investigation had shown Tapia merited an interpreter, the judge should
have complied with the affirmative waiver provision of section 1827.2"
The "waiver of an interpreter is not a decision for his counsel or the Court
after the Court explains to him the
to make. It is the defendant's decision,
258
nature and effect of a waiver."
250. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1049-51 (9th Cir. 1994); Sanchez, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16725, at *3°*8.
251. United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1294(10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Tapia,
631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980).
252. See Osuna, 189 F.3d at 1294; Topia, 631 F.2d at 1209.
Any individual other than a witness who is entitled to interpretation under
subsection (d)of this section may waive such interpretation in whole or in part.

Such a waiver shall be effective only if approved by the presiding judicial officer
and made expressly by such individual on the record after opportunity to consult
with counsel and after the presiding judicial officer has explained to such

individual, utilizing the services of the most available certified interpreter, or when
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, as determined by the presiding
judicial officer, the services of an otherwise competent interpreter, the nature and
effect of the waiver.
28 U.S.C. § 1827(0(1) (2000).
253. Tapia, 631 F.2d at 1208.
254. Id. at 1209.
255.. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.

258. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit later cited the Tapia opinion in United States v.
OsunaY9 In Osuna, the prosecution suggested the defendant be appointed
a Spanish/English interpreter during trial. 260 However, Felix Osuna's
lawyer responded that using an interpreter "would even be more
difficult. '2 6' The district court did not inquire further as to the defendant's
potential interpreter need.26 The court of appeals held that neither the
defense attorney nor the district court could effectively waive defendant
Felix Osuna's interpreter access.263 "If the defendant stated he wished to
waive his rights under the [CIA], the trial judge should have determined the
validity of such waiver, which was required to be made by the defendant
himself, not by his counsel or the trial court."264 Nevertheless, most circuits
permit a defense attorney, who is relying on trial procedure or strategy, to
waive the client's interpreter assistance, thereby relieving the district court
from its duty to investigate the defendant's potential linguistic need.265
These same appellate courts do not interpret section 1827 as requiring the
defendant's express waiver until after the investigation, when the district
court has determined that the defendant has a right to an interpreter. 'The
waiver privilege is, of course, personal to the defendant, but it only factors
into the proceeding upon a judicial finding that either the defendant's
comprehension of the proceedings, or his communications with counsel or
the court, is inhibited by language or hearing difficulties."'2 6 Ironically
then, only those defendants who qualify for interpreter services but do not
want them are guaranteed the statutory right of an affirmative waiver by the
trial judge. Because of some circuit courts' Valladares-induced
preoccupation with immigrant "blameworthiness," their opinions on
interpreter access seem to be only peripherally about the linguistic need of
semi-English-fluent defendants. These appellate courts are disinclined to
look beyond the defendants' silence in assessing the trial judges' discretion.
Nor do they mandate that district courts thoroughly investigate and make
factual findings of the defendants' true linguistic needs. In effect, by
divining an implied waiver, appellate courts have rendered the discretion
exercised by trial judges virtually unreviewable. The result is nearly
complete "appellate abdication." 267

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

189 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1294.
See supra notes 249, 250.
United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488,491 (5th Cir. 1990).
See generally Friendly, supra note 79, at 765-67.
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C. "LinguisticNeed" as a Set of "GeneralRules" Rather
Than as a Standard
Established social values or norms govern personal interaction. Human
conduct is the instantiation or failure to instantiate a norm. In exercising
primary discretion, a trial judge has the flexibility of evaluating the
significance of certain conduct with respect to the relevant norm on a caseby-case basis.268 Guiding the judge in this process are one or more
standards that directly reference and thus help reinforce acceptable
norms.269 In applying a standard, the judge must "both... discover the
facts of a particular situation and... assess them in terms of the purposes
or social values embodied in the standard." 270 The standard of linguistic
need requires the trial judge to investigate an immigrant defendant's
English difficulty to ascertain whether it interferes with the defendant's
ability to comprehend the proceedings and communicate with court and
counsel within the meaning of the CIA and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments."1 Once made, the judge's decision on interpreter access is
rarely disturbed on appeal. 22 And, appellate courts have declined to review
the judge's exercise of discretion according to a set of rigid rules that
would predetermine linguistic need. 273 Nor has Congress done more than
encourage trial judges to use their best efforts in assessing linguistic
need.274 That appellate courts and Congress have refused to formulate strict
boundaries beyond which sound judgment morphs into personal bias or
arbitrariness is what makes the trial judge's exercise of judicial discretion
meaningful. 5 The flexibility and broad-scope of the linguistic need
268. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. "The final reason ... for bestowing
discretion on the trial judge as to many matters is, paradoxically, the superiority of his nether

position. It is not that he knows more than his loftier brothers; rather, he sees more and senses
more." Rosenberg, supra note 80, at 663.
269. Kennedy, supra note 46, at 1688.

270. Id.
271. "A standard refers directly to one of the substantive objectives of the legal order." Id.
272. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.

273.
The use of an interpreter under section 1827 is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial judge. Because the proper handling of translation hinges on a variety
of factors, including the defendant's knowledge of English and the complexity of
the proceedings and testimony, the trial judge, who is in direct contact with the
defendant, must be given wide discretion.
Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (1lth Cir. 1989) (citations ornitted).
274. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
275.
While the judge has the ultimate responsibility in determining whether or not an
interpreter is required under this legislation, it is anticipated that counsel will alert

the judge's attention to the fact that an interpreter may be needed. It is anticipated
that the need for formal proceedings to make an initial determination of whether
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standard enables the trial judge to deal with as many unique and disparate
facts in which the issue of interpreter access can arise. 276 In other words, the
"shouldness" of completed acts or omissions can be generalized without
depriving them of their uniqueness. Otherwise, any "how to" approach in
terms of "formally realizable rules"' 7 would not only be under-inclusive
for facts that fail to fit the rules, but would also function in a fundamentally
mechanical way.278
In truth, however, when interpreter access is at issue, the redeeming
qualities of district court discretion are the purveyors of its own corruption.
The absence of any congressionally or judicially mandated formal
realizability of linguistic need has left a void. Simply 'put, trial judges are
unsure what the standard means and how it should be applied. After all,
they are not usually trained to identify and assess a defendant's English
proficiency.279 Unencumbered by de novo review,280 appellate judges avoid
close scrutiny of the judge's interpretation of the standard. They are no
more positive of its meaning and application than is the district court. The
result of such uncertainty is sub rosa judicial lawmaking in an effort to fill
the void.281 "Judicial private lawmaking takes place precisely in those
marginal and interstitial areas of the legal system where there is
unequivocal, or even extremely suggestive indication of legislative will."28
In essence, circuit courts in conjunction with district courts "legislate and
enforce" de facto general rules. These rules are not formally realizable; they
do not involve fact-finding with respect to a known regime of legal
the appointment of an interpreter is required will be minimal. Instead, we

anticipate that during discovery or other pretrial matters counsel for both parties
will be able to assess the language capability of a party. Upon agreement of both
attorneys and perhaps brief questioning by the judge of the party, the judge can
make the determination regarding appointment of an interpreter.
S. REP. No. 95-569, at 7 (1977) (Judiciary Committee). The Senate bill was passed in lieu of the
House bill after amending its language to contain the text of the House bill.
276. "The wide scope of the rule or standard is an attempt to deal with as many as possible of
different imaginable fact situations in which a substantive issue may arise." Kennedy, supra note
46, at 1689. "Narrow rules [are the] antithesis of primary discretion." Rosenberg, supra note 80,

at 639.
277. "The extreme of formal realizability is a directive to an official that requires him to

respond to the presence together of each of a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a
situation." Kennedy, supra note 46, at 1687.
278. Id. at 1695. "The non-amenability of the problem to rule, because of the diffuseness of
circumstances, novelty, vagueness, or similar reasons that argue for allowing experience to develop,

appears to be a sound reason for conferring discretion on the magistrate." Rosenberg, supra note
80, at 663.
279. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
280. See Judge Reinhardt's dissent in which he makes the case for de novo review. Gonzalez
v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
281. See Kennedy, supra note 46, at 1690.
282. Id. at 1760.
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directives.2 3 Rather, they are standard-like in that they inhere the "value
judgments" of current norms. 28 The sub rosa rules for interpreter access
are embedded in the text of appellate decisions that shore up the legitimacy
of the "foreigner" meme. In particular, these rules serve to validate the
dominant culture's perception of the immigrant's "blameworthiness" for
the trial judge's failure to appoint an interpreter. Individually, or more
typically, in combination, the following rules prescribe an implied waiver
of interpreter services or justify their omission at trial: (1) An immigrant
with educational, employment levels and United States residence greater
than those of defendant Negron is presumed to know English sufficiently.
(2) A semi-English-fluent immigrant who does not overtly indicate an
inability to comprehend the proceedings or to communicate with court or
counsel cannot satisfy linguistic need. (3) The silence of a semi-Englishfluent defendant, or defense counsel, or both is a passive waiver of the CIA
as well as Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to interpreter services.
As a practical matter, the general rules are not a workable regime for
ensuring that those who merit interpreter services should receive them.
First, because they emanate from the dominant culture's nativism toward
the immigrant defendant, rather than from an objective judicial assessment
of the defendant's language skills, such rules are ineffective as arbitrary
and emotionally biased. Indeed, their application transforms the tenor of
trial judge decisionmaking from a cooperative effort to an adversarial
process between district court and defendant. Second, based on faulty
presumptions about immigrants, the rules are both analytically under and
over-inclusive for those who know some English. Some but not all
immigrants with prolonged education, employment, and residence
in
America are:statutorily and constitutionally proficient in English. Third, the
rules lack certainty and thus fail to deter wrongful conduct. 2 Because the
rules are covert and defacto, immigrants receive no advance notice on how
the federal justice system handles interpreter access.8 6 How then can nonprimary English speaking defendants anticipate the consequences of their
behavior? Finally, the English language deficiencies that arise are2 too
varied in kind and degree to be reducible to a functional set of rules. 17
283. "Bycontrast, formallyrealizablerulesinvolvethefindingoffacts."Ld. at 1752. "Formally
realizable general rules are, by definition, knowable in advance." Id. at 1739.
284. Id. at 1752. "Standards refer directly to the substantive values or purposes of the
community. They involve 'value judgments."' Id.

285. Id. at 1695, 1739.
2"86. "Certainty, on the other hand, is valued for its effect on the citizenry: if private actors can
know in advance the incidence of official intervention, they will adjust their activities in advance
to take account of them." Id. at 1688.
287..
.Another principle supporting deference to rulings of the trial court is the absence
of the benefits that ordinarily flow from appellate review in establishing rules that

will govern future cases. This is true in the frequent situations... where the
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IV. CONCLUSION

The "foreigner" meme has profoundly influenced primary and
secondary discretion regarding interpreter access. At the district court level,
the standard of linguistic need has devolved into a set of fixed general rules
that mirror current anti-immigrant sentiment in this country. The district
courts' application of these rules tends to supplant any vigorous factfinding efforts to individuate each non-native speaker's true English
proficiency. Moreover, the exercise of primary discretion to regulate
interpreter services is not ajoint enterprise shared by judge and defendant.
Instead, it pits a wary judge against a potentially "deceitful" defendant who
may be manipulating the justice system to obtain an undeserved benefit. At
the circuit court level, the exercise of secondary discretion has nearly
insulated from appellate scrutiny those district court decisions barring
interpreter access. In turn, the nativistic leanings underlying the general
rules are sanctioned and reinforced for use in subsequent criminal
proceedings. More specifically, the judicially contrived "passive waiver"
is readily attributable to defendants who remain silent at trial and then
claim on appeal that their lack of interpreter services is reversible error.
Although it is severe, the impact of the."foreigner" meme on judicial
discretion is symptomatic of the more fundamental problem of allowing
primary and secondary discretion to regulate interpreter access. The
problem raises several issues, namely, the level of reviewability that
appellate courts should extend to trial judge decisions on interpreter
services and whether "silence" should be considered as the defendant's
implied waiver of such services. These two issues, to be discussed
separately, are indeed related.
All district court discretionary decisions, both procedural and
substantive, are subject to review for "abuse of discretion." However, the
standard is misleading in that the degree of appellate scrutiny will depend
upon the nature of the decision. 8 9 "[I]n fact the scope of review will be
directly related to the reason why that category or type of decision is
committed to the trial court's discretion in the first instance." 29° Largely
unassailable on appeal are rulings on pre-trial procedural issues because
they derive from the judge's superior vantage point of witnesses, jury and

factors "are so numerous, variable and subtle that the fashioning of rigid rules
would be more likely to impair the trial judge's ability to deal fairly with a
particular problem that would lead to ajust result."
Friendly, supra note 79, at 760 (quoting United States v.McCoy, 517 F.2d 41, 44 (7th Cir. 1975)).
288. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814,817 (3d Cir. 1981).
289. Id.

290. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

49

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

lawyers.291 Of significance is that "some but by no means all of these
rulings escape only by inches the mandate against reversal for 'errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."' 2 A
decision on interpreter access falls within this category as a pre-trial
procedural matter that depends upon the judge's first-hand knowledge of
linguistic need. The correlative "hands-off' appellate attitude is reasonable
when the issue is the appointment of witness interpreters. A district court
is in the best position to determine its own linguistic need as well as the
need of both the jury and attorneys when a non-English speaking witness
testifies. And, since the purpose of witness interpreter appointments is to
promote an orderly trial, the circuit courts should defer to the district
court's exercise of discretion. Indeed, the appointment of a witness
interpreter stems from the judge's inherent authority to ensure expeditious
proceedings.293 However, most appeals now deal with party and
proceedings interpreter access, which implicates the defendant's
constitutional rights and thus raises more than just questions of fact.
The statutory predicate for providing an interpreter is the factual
determination that the defendant's English deficiency inhibits
comprehension of the proceedings or communication with either counsel
or the judge.29 More is at stake here than procedural convenience for the
criminal defendant. In making its factual determination, the district court
is also resolving a question of law concerning the defendant's ability to
vindicate Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections during trial.
As a conclusion of law that implicates substantive rights of great
significance, the absence of an interpreter appointment mandates de novo
review by the circuit court. 295 Appellate courts have failed to realize this
because the nature of interpreter access has changed. Their traditional
abstention in exercising secondary discretion is no longer justified. As a
derivative right, the question of providing interpreter services during trial
should be subjected to close appellate scrutiny. Instituting de novo review
would also discourage circuit courts from inferring an implied waiver of
fundamental rights from the defendant's silence regarding interpreter
services. In this context, an implied waiver is a spurious court-created
device. It is spurious for three reasons. First, the term "implied waiver"
falsely suggests the defendant intended to forego interpreter access, when
there may have been other reasons for the failure to request interpreter
services orto object to their absence. Second, an implied waiver is in fact
ajudicial limitation on the defendant's access to interpreter services rather
291. Id. at 818-19; see also Friendly, supranote 79, at 760; Rosenberg, supranote 80, at 646.
292. Friendly, supra note 79, at 760.
293. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
295, See Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d. 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
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than the defendant's decision to refrain from obtaining services made
available by the district court. Third, "implied waiver" is actually a
misnomer, and as such, effectively conceals what the defendant's silence
actually means-a forfeiture as opposed to a waiver.
Forfeiture and waiver are entirely distinct. Forfeiture "is the failure to
make the timely assertion of a right," which does not preclude appellate
review of a claim for plain error.296 Despite the lack of a timely objection
during trial, an error is reviewable on appeal if it is "plain" or obvious on
the record and "affect[s] substantial rights" or is prejudicial in that it
influenced the outcome of the trial.297 "An error may seriously affect the
fairness, integrity or public reputation ofjudicial proceedings, independent
of the defendant's innocence." 298 Waiver is the "'intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right,"' which extinguishes the claim
altogether. 299 In essence, it is a tactical decision. For example, in United
States v. Huang, the circuit court concluded that two of the defendants at
trial "through their attorneys, made sufficient attempts to waive their rights
to object to the non-certified interpreter and non-verbatim translation"
where the lawyers opposed a mistrial motion made by other defendants and
stated their-intention to "live with" the witnesses' testimony as rendered by
the interpreter.3" Generally, a waiver of interpreter services is effected
pursuant to the CIA, which requires the defendant's "express" waiver on
the record after consultation with counsel and explanation by the judge of
the nature and effect of the waiver. °
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the application of federal
laws regarding interpreter access involves some complex issues, made
more complicated by the influence of the "foreigner" meme. I believe that
modifying, while still retaining primary and secondary discretion, would
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 773 (1993).
Id. at 734 (quoting FED. R. CRN. P. 52(b)).
Id. at 736-37 (quoting United States v. Atdnson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
Id. at 733 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
United States v. Huang, 960 F.2d 1128, 1136 (2d Cir. 1992).
28 U.S.C. § 1827(0(1) provides:
Any individual other than a witness who is entitled to interpretation under
subsection (d) of this section may waive such interpretation in whole or in part.
Such a waiver shall be effective only if approved by the presiding judicial officer
and made expressly by such individual on the record after opportunity to consult
with counsel and after the presiding judicial officer has explained to such
individual, utilizing the services of the most available certified interpreter, or when
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, as determined by the presiding
judicial officer, the services of an otherwise competent interpreter, the nature and
effect of the waiver.

Id. An extensive examination of forfeiture and waiver with respect to interpreter access is beyond
the purview of this article.
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only further complicate the semi-English-fluent defendant's ability to
obtain interpreter services when appropriate. Moreover, altering judicial
discretion would not eradicate the "foreigner" meme that directs the
exercise of that discretion. It would be more efficient and effective simply
to dispense with primary discretion altogether and to allow interpreter
access on demand. Similar to the Miranda warning, the district court could
be required to advise all criminal defendants of their right to an interpreter
appointment. Those defendants who wanted them would receive them.
Those who did not would waive them pursuant to the express waiver
provision of the CIA. Unless and until the "foreigner" meme is no longer
ingrained in the fabric of the judiciary, and of society as a whole, the rights
of immigrant defendants will remain hostages of the dominant culture's
nativism.
The 1993 film FallingDown scripted the following dialogue between
a Korean-born merchant ("Asian") with "a heavy accent" and a nativeEnglish-speaking customer (De-Fens):
De-Fens ... You give me seventy "fie" cents back for the
phone... What is a fie? There's a "V" in the word. Fie-vuh.
Don't they have "v's" in China?
Asian: Not Chinese. I am Korean.
De-Fens: Whatever. What difference does that make? You
come over here and take my money and you don't even have
the grace to learn to speak my language .... 302
In this exchange, the native speaking customer is expressing the
"foreigner" meme. He is accusing the Korean merchant of entering this
country, achieving aposition of economic power while failing to assimilate
by learning English. 0 3
Of course, the evidence is just the opposite of what the
customer is claiming: the shop owner does speak English. He
speaks English well enough to get into a rousing argument
with the customer, to assert his rights as owner of the shop,
302. RosINA LIpPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN AcCENT: LANGUAGE., IDEOLOGY, AND
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 225 (1997).

303.
The Korean has committed three sins in the eyes of the customer he has "come
over here" and, having immigrated, he "takes my money" by establishing himself
in a social position in which he has economic capital and goods to dispense. These
sins are compounded by the fact that the shop owner "doesn't have the grace to
learn to speak my language."
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and to ask the customer to leave. But, crucially, he does not
speak English to the customer's satisfaction, because he
speaks with an Asian accent."
As with Amadou Diallo, the merchant's inability to speak English
fluidly or to sound "American" communicates to the customer, as a
member of the dominant culture, an outright rejection of dominant culture
norms. Moreover, the dominant culture views an immigrant, like the shop
owner, who manages financial success without fully acculturating, as likely
to alter and control the current social order. In response, the dominant
culture uses the linguistic imperfections of non-native speakers as the
means to rationalize and accomplish their subordination. °5 An accent is
perceived as an "immutable characteristic" of speech.' 6 However, there is
a hierarchy of accented speech in white America."° Dominant culture
members usually describe as "incomprehensible" the English of
immigrants who are the most marginalized in society. 308 Typically these
non-native speakers are also ethnic minorities. °9 When the "unintelligible
speech" of such immigrants inevitably leads them to experience hardship
in white America, the dominant culture faults their "refusal" to assimilate.
Yet, until the dominant culture no longer "hears" their accent, these
immigrants will never be allowed to join the melting pot, even if they want
to acculturate. American English has thus become the dominant culture's
tool of maintaining social order in this country.310 And, the "foreigner"
meme is the projection of both the dominant culture's fear and will.

304. Id.
305. Karst, supra note 7, at 352.
306. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.L 1329, 1392-92 (1991).
307. Id. at 1352.
In many societies, certain dialects and accents are associated with wealth and
power. Others are low-status, with negative associations. In a society with a
speech hierarchy of this kind, it is quite common that speakers of the low-status
speech variety, by necessity, are able to understand speakers of the high-status
variety. Speakers of the high-status variety, on the other hand, frequently report
that they cannot understand speakers below them on the speech-status scale.
Id.
308. See id. at 1352. "Low-status accents will sound foreign and unintelligible. High-status
accents will sound clear and competent." !d. at 1355.
309. See id, at 1352.
310. "(A]s history constantly teach us, discourse is not simply that which translates struggles
or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the
power which is to be seized." Michel Foucault, The Order of Discourse, in LANGUAGE AND
PoLrrics 108, 110 (Michael J. Shapiro ed., 1984).
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